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E. INCONSISTENCIES

UNDER TRIPS ARTICLES

INTRODUCTION
This Comment argues that the failure of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") to account for vastly different conceptions of
intellectual property, as applied to geographic indicators, signals the
likely collapse of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs").' The controversy over
portions of the TRIPs agreement does not derive merely from the
WTO Member countries' self-interested trade policy considerations,
as many commentators maintain,2 but from a collision of ideals in
intellectual property jurisprudence.' This account focuses on the

1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, arts. 22-24
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, December 15,
1993, Part II, Section 3, arts. 22-24 [hereinafter TRIPs] (setting forth general
provisions, enforcement of and standards concerning intellectual property rights).
2. See Stacy D. Goldberg, Comment, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The
Battle Between the United States and the European Union Over the Protection of
GeographicalIndications, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 107, 151 (2001) (concluding
that the conflict over protection of geographical indicators is "essentially an issue
of international trade and global economics"); see also Harun Kazmi, Does It
Make a Difference Where that Chablis Comes from? Geographic Indications in
TRIPs and NAFTA, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 470, 472 (2001) (suggesting
that the prices that products protected under the TRIPs agreement command on the
international market motivate countries' concern over intellectual property
protections).
3. See Christine Haight Farley, Conflicts Between U.S. Law and International
Treaties Concerning Geographical Indications, 22 WHITTIER L. REv. 73, 74
(2000) (noting that part of U.S. resistance involved the obvious disparity of trade
benefits that the contested portions of TRIPs would yield in the United States and
the European Union); see also Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical
Indications in the TRIPs Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 13 (1996)
(explaining that "those countries which have a strong tradition of recognizing
geographical indications are not only concerned about the economic consequences
of a dilution of their geographical names, but also about a part of their 'cultural
heritage"').
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legal dimensions of the TRIPs controversy, which are the product of
fundamental misunderstandings between the European Union
("E.U.") and the United States regarding the appropriate role of
geographic indicators within an intellectual property rights regime."
This Comment will first define geographical indicators,5 introduce
TRIPs Articles 22-24,6 and explain the origin of intellectual property
rights in geographic indicators in the United States and Europe.7 This
account will then describe the applicable mechanisms of U.S. law 8
and consider pertinent decisions in the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"). 9 The background portion of this Comment will conclude by
discussing the three multilateral attempts to protect geographical
indicators that came before TRIPs.
Next, this Comment will analyze the conflicting normative ends
that characterize the controversy over TRIPs Articles 22-24,1I
arguing that what did not work within Europe under the ECJ will not
work outside of Europe under TRIPs, 2 and that TRIPs Articles 22-24
will fail for the same reasons that past multilateral agreements
failed. 3 Analysis of TRIPs Articles 22-24 will then turn inward,

4. See Farley,supra note 3, at 75 (arguing that the dispute is about conflicting
notions of trademark law, and that the United States does not actually stand to
benefit from the contested portions of TRIPs); see also Goldberg, supra note 2, at
134, 144 (asserting, in an apparent reversal, that the conflict has nothing to do with
economic considerations, but with Europe's tradition of providing robust
protection for geographic indicators and the United States' comparatively weak
jurisprudence).
5. See infra Part L.A (defining geographic indicators).
6. See infra Part I.B (describing TRIPs Articles 22-24).
7. See infra Part I.C (exploring the genesis of geographic indicators as an
intellectual property concept in the United States and Europe).
8. See infra Part I.D (discussing those provisions of U.S. law that concern
geographic indicators).
9. See infra Part I.E (noting relevant ECJ case law).
10. See infra Part I.F (describing comparable multilateral agreements prior to
TRIPs).
11. See infra Part II.A (investigating the clash of normative objectives that the
controversy over TRIPs Articles 22-24 embodies).
12. See infra Part II.B (discussing the ECJ's unsuccessful attempts at enforcing
intellectual property rights).
13. See infra Part JI.C (contending that TRIPs Articles 22-24 exhibit the same
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assessing problems with disparities between the substantive
standards of TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a), 22(3), and 23(l) 1" and
examining inconsistencies in the exceptions available under TRIPs
Article 24, and in the call for further negotiations by TRIPs Articles
23(4) and 24(1).15 Recommendations as to how the WTO should
reform TRIPs, 16 as well as a brief conclusion,17 will follow.

I. BACKGROUND
A. DEFINING GEOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

Geographic indicators are a means of identifying the source and
denoting the quality and reputation of regionally distinct agricultural
goods 8 for purposes of product recognition on the international
market. 9 The wine market, for example, is not primarily a "branded"
market,20 although there are certain examples to the contrary, such as
Ernest and Julio Gallo.21 Instead, wine producers overwhelmingly
defects as unsuccessful multilateral agreements that came before).
14. See infra Part II.D (exploring inconsistencies in the substantive standards
available under TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a), 22(3), and 23(1)).
15. See infra Part II.E (dissecting the disparities in the exceptions available
under TRIPs Article 24, and in the call for further negotiations in TRIPs Articles
23(4) and 24(1)).
16. See infra Part III (suggesting possible resolutions to TRIPs Articles 22-24's
deficiencies).
17. See infra "Conclusion" (resolving that TRIPs Articles 22-24 surpass a
sustainable level of international consensus, and create confusion and bias).
18. See infra text accompanying note 35 (noting varying definitions of
geographic indicators, all of which encompass some reference to the influence of
"natural factors," soil, or climate).
19. See Steven A. Bowers, Location, Location, Location: The Case Against
Extending GeographicalIndication Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement, 31
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q. J. 129, 131 (2003) (stating that geographic
indicators identify the source of a good, denote quality, and protect business
concerns).
20. See Leigh Ann Lindquist, Champagneor Champagne?An Examination of
U.S. Failure to Comply With The Geographical Provisions of the TRIPs
Agreement, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 334-35 (1999) (noting that the wine
market is not only characterized by brands, but by geographic indicators).
21. See Michael Maher, Comment, On Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of
Geographic References on American Wine Labels, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1881, 1892
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seek to achieve product recognition using geographic indicators.22
Better-known examples include "Champagne," "Claret," and
"Port. '23 Such marks do more than simply indicate the origin of a
good. They denote a guarantee of quality and distinctiveness derived
from a combination of unique regional, environmental, and human
influences, such as climate, soil, subsoil, plants, and special methods
of production-particularly traditional, collectively observed farming
and processing techniques.24 TRIPs itself requires "a given quality,
(2001) (listing the four pieces of information that premium wine labels typically
convey to the consumer: brand name "(for example, Gallo)," grape varietal "(for
example, Chardonnay)," vintage year "(for example, 1998)," or geographical
indicator).
22. See Kazmi, supra note 2, at 471 ("As far back as nations have been
engaged in trade, association of a product with its geographic origin has been a
favored method of identifying the product's source"); see also Lindquist, supra
note 20, at 331 (noting that "[t]he average consumer orders a glass of sherry or
burgundy," indicating that geographical indicators have become commonly used as
semi-generic wine types); Maher, supra note 21, at 1885-86 (explaining that
producers use geographic indicators as marketing devices in order to limit areas of
production, cultivate "regional notoriety," and "provide monopolistic protection
and value-added").
23. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 309 (listing exemplars of geographic
indicators).
24. See Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
Their International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, as last revised Jan. 1, 1994, 923
U.N.T.S. 205, art. 2(1) [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement] (defining "appellation of
origin" to mean "the geographical name of a country, region, or locality, which
serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and characteristics of
which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment,
at
factors"),
available
natural
and
human
including
http://www.tco.ir/law/English/Regulation/Intemational/Global%20protection%20s
ystem%20tereaties/agreement.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); see also Corrs
Chambers Westgarth, Lawyers, WTO and the Clash of the New World/Old World
Wine Producers, [hereinafter WTO and the Clash] (noting that the notion of
"terroir" includes region-specific grape varieties, viticultural practices, soil,
at
environment"),
and
"climate
subsoil,
http://www.corrs.com.auAWebStreamer?page-id=2202 (last visited Mar. 16, 2004);
P. Kanagavel, IntellectualProperty Rights: A Comprehensive Overview, 85 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 663, 677 (2003) (indicating that protected agricultural
goods customarily possess attributes deriving from "specific local factors, such as
climate and soil"); World Intellectual Property Organization, What Is a
Geographical Indication? Can Geographical Indications Only Be Used for
AgriculturalProducts? (listing climate, soil, skills, and traditions as characteristics
bound up in the notion of geographical indicators), at http://www.wipo.org/aboutip/en/about-geographical-ind.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
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essentially attributable to...

B. TRIPs ARTICLES 22-24
The WTO concluded TRIPs in 1994, at the end of the Uruguay
Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
negotiations.2 6 With the support of most of the developed economies,
including the United States, Japan, the E.U., and Switzerland,2 7 the
settled portions of the TRIPs agreement contemplate strong

international safeguards for traditional intellectual property rights,
such as trademarks, copyrights, and patents.28
Agreement ended when several Members proposed that TRIPs
should encompass the protection of geographical indicators.29 Since

the Uruguay Round, the so-called "New World" wine producers"
have opposed the "Old World" wine producers' 3 1 efforts to extend

25. TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
26. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 116 (relating that 140 WTO Members
became parties to the TRIPs agreement on January 1, 1995 at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round).
27. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 315-16 (indicating those countries that
supported the worldwide extension of a protective intellectual property rights
regime during the Uruguay Round of WTO talks).
28. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 116 (noting those areas of intellectual
property that the industrialized economies readily agreed to protect under TRIPs).
29. See Farley, supra note 3, at 74-75 (explaining that during the Uruguay
Round TRIPs negotiations, "the United States... took a strongly pro-protectionist,
pro-property position," but was subsequently "resistant to adopt the protections of
geographical indications urged by some countries, such as France in particular");
see also Lindquist, supra note 20, at 315-16 (noting that consensus between the
United States and the European Union faltered when discussions began on
geographical indications with respect to wine and the E.U. proposed the
framework of TRIPs Articles 22-24). Elsewhere, Lindquist describes TRIPs
Articles 22-24 as the product of European opportunism: "[n]ow that the New
World economy dominates the world.... the European Union... suddenly wants
to enforce rights it long ago opted not to protect." Id. at 342.
30. See WTO and the Clash, supra note 24, (listing the United States,
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, and Uruguay as
the so-called "New World Wine Producers").
31. See id. (noting that France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Austria are
foremost among the "Old World Wine Producers").
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TRIPs to encompass robust protections for geographic indicators.32
Although the United States gave assurances that it would enter

further negotiations directed at settling its differences with the
European Union on this question,3 3 subsequent events indicate it has
34
not done so.

TRIPs Article 22 defines geographic indicators3" and establishes
several operative requirements.36 Firstly, Members must amend their
laws to allow parties to prevent the use of any indicator that falsely
represents the origin of a good in a way that misleads the consumer.37
32. See Press Release, United States Department of State, U.S. Seeks
Voluntary System on Protecting Wine, Spirits Naming Rights (Sept. 20, 2002)
[hereinafter Protecting Naming Rights] (indicating that Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Namibia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
and Taiwan have joined the United States in opposing TRIPs' protection of
geographic indicators), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/02092001.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
33. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(4) (stating, "negotiations shall be
undertaken in the Council for TRIPs concerning the establishment of a multilateral
system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines"); see
also Protecting Naming Rights, supra note 32 (noting that the Doha Development
Agenda requires WTO Members to complete negotiations by September 2003).
34. See Peter M. Brody, "Semi-Generic" Geographical Wine Designations:
Did Congress Trip Over TRIPs?, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 979 (1999)
(contending that federal legislation enacted in 1997 contravenes the United States'
TRIPs obligations by strengthening American producers' ability to use false or
inaccurate but non-misleading geographical indicators); see also Kazmi, supra
note 2, at 474 (arguing that the 1997 legislation essentially flouts the TRIPs
Agreement); Lindquist, supra note 20, at 311, 327 (contending that Congress
"tested the boundaries" of TRIPs Article 23 with the 1997 legislation, and arguing
that the newer law ignores the E.U.'s desire to see the ATF acknowledge "semigenerics" as protected geographical indicators).
35. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (stating that geographic indicators are
"indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a
region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation, or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin").
36. See Peter Brody, Protection of GeographicalIndications in the Wake of
TRIPs: Existing United States Law and the Administration'sProposedLegislation,
84 TRADEMARK REP. 520, 521-22 (1994) (noting that TRIPs Article 22 requires
Members to provide the legal means to block false or inaccurate and misleading
indicators and prevent their registration as trademarks).
37. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(2)(a) (requiring that Members change their
laws in order to give litigants the legal means to block "designation or presentation
of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a
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Secondly, Members must prevent acts that fall within the Paris
Convention's38 definition of unfair competition.39 The Paris
Convention loosely defines unfair competitive practices,40 and
prohibits the use of marketing devices that could prejudice the
competitive environment or mislead the public as to the nature or
quality of a good. 41 Lastly, TRIPs Article 22(3) compels Members to
prevent the registration of false or inaccurate and misleading
geographic indicators as trademarks. 2
TRIPs Article 23 contemplates further protections for wines and
spirits.43 Where wines or spirits are concerned, Members must allow
parties to bar the use of any false or inaccurate geographic indicator,
even if the indicator appears in translation or if accompanying
language demonstrates that the product actually comes from
somewhere else." Next, Article 23 bars registration of any wine or
spirit trademark consisting of a false or inaccurate geographic
indicator. 45 Finally, this portion directs Members to negotiate with

geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads
the public").
38. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
39. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(2)(b) (compelling Member states to enable
parties to prevent unfair competitive practices "within the meaning of Article. 10bis
of the Paris Convention").
40. See Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 10bis(2) (defining unfair
competition as anything contrary to "honest practices").
41. See id. art. 10bis(3)(1)-(3) (forbidding producers from employing any
marketing device that could confuse consumers as to competitors' market position
or a good's qualities or characteristics).
42. See TRIPs, supra note 1,art. 22(3) (requiring Members to refuse trademark
registration for goods that do not originate from their apparent source).
43. See id. art. 23 (calling for "Additional Protection for Geographical
Indications for Wines and Spirits").
44. See id. art. 23(1) (indicating that Members must give parties the means to
prevent the false or inaccurate use of an indicator, even if the packaging discloses
the true origin of the goods, or if the indicator appears in translation or alongside
"'kind,' 'type,' 'style,' 'imitation,' or the like").
45. See id. art. 23(2) (prohibiting registration of any indicator that does not
denote the true source of a good).
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the 'explicit purpose of establishing a multilateral registry for any
wine indicators that receive protection in the Member countries.46
TRIPs Article 24 provides an exception for producers who have
consistently used a false or inaccurate geographical indicator 4 or
who have registered such an indicator as a trademark.48 Article 24
also places the false or inaccurate use of generic indicators beyond
the ambit of Articles 22 and 23.49 Article 24 simultaneously "freezes"
the protection available under Articles 22 and 23 at whatever level it
existed on the eve of the Marrakesh signing." Additionally,
Members must negotiate increased protections for wines and spirits,
and may not invoke any Article 24 exceptions in order to refuse to
engage in talks. 1
C. THE ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES APPLYING
TO GEOGRAPHIC INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

In Europe, the recognition of a proprietary interest in geographic
indicators emerged from the Romanistic legal tradition,52 which

46. See id. art. 23(4) (calling upon WTO Members to discuss the establishment
of a multilateral registry exclusively for wine appellations).
47. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 24(4) (establishing an exception to the
provisions of Articles 22 and 23 for Member states whose producers have used a
false or inaccurate geographical indicator "in a continuous manner with regard to
the same or related goods or services in the territory of that Member state either (a)
for at least 10 years preceding 15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith preceding that
date").
48. See id. art. 24(5) (allowing producers to continue using indicators that they
have registered as trademarks "in good faith" either before implementing
legislation takes effect or before national law begins to protect an indicator in its
country of origin).
49. See id. art. 24(6) (indicating that protection does not extend to goods "for
which the relevant indication is identical with the term customary in common
language as the common name for such goods").
50. See id. art. 24(3) (stating that Members may not diminish the level of
protection their national laws afforded geographic indicators at the time the WTO
became effective).
51. See id. art. 24(1) (calling upon WTO Members to undertake negotiations
directed at strengthening Article 23, as well as forbidding parties from using
Article 24(4)-(8) to challenge such talks).
52. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 17-18 (explaining that the French tradition
derives from the bifurcated Romanistic system of registration of "indications of
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continues to influence a majority of European countries' intellectual
property regimes. 3 Commentators point to France's regime of
"produits de terroir"as the quintessential example, in which judges

or a government agency can award producers a proprietary right in a
geographic indicator based upon their assessment of a good's
relationship to its source.54 In 1824, French legislation gave
producers their first positive proprietary interest in geographic

indicators.5 A 1919 law contemplated more thorough protections for
appellations of origin. 6 Under this system, qualified producers have

source" and "appellations of origin").
53. See id. at 19 (describing the spread, throughout Europe and South America,
of the Romanistic legal tradition and, most notably, the registration system for
geographical indicators).
54. See David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to
Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253, 269-70 (citing the
French model as one in which regionally-distinct products may qualify for positive
legal protection under the controlled appellations system if officials found that they
derived a unique value or characteristic from a combination of environmental and
cultural factors).
55. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 312-13 (relaying that the 1824 law
threatened producers who falsely designated the origin of their goods with criminal
sanctions).
56. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 17-18 (explaining that appellations of origin
receive more specified protection than mere indications of source under France's
Law on the Protection of Appellations of Origin of May 6, 1919 and subsequent
amendments). This system of registration divides geographic indicators into one of
two categories: "indications of source" and "appellations of origin." Id. The first
category consists of those products that bear a geographical indicator merely for
purposes of source identification. Id. The second category consists of products that
have particularly important place names. Id. at 18. These place names denote not
only where the product comes from, but also a guarantee of quality and particular
region-specific aspects of production. Id.French law embodies this distinction
explicitly: the first category enjoys protection under a regime of unfair competition
law, as by the provisions of a 1905 enactment that proscribes "usurpation of
denomination." Id. at 17-18. Conversely, qualification for an appellation of origin
requires either a judicial determination or an administrative act stating that the
product satisfies all requirements attendant upon a particular appellation. See
Conrad, supra note 3, at 18. Producers whose goods meet the requirements of a
given appellation subsequently register the products with a government agency that
can enforce property rights through injunctions. Id. See also Lindquist, supra note
20, at 312-13 (noting that the 1919 legislation broadened protection by recognizing
quality, and not just origin, as a factor).
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a positive, exclusive property right to an appellation, which they may

vindicate before a judge or government agency. 7
In sharp contrast, the Anglo-American tradition has not
traditionally recognized an exclusive property right in geographic
indicators.5 8 Most intellectual property rights regimes, including that
of the United States, acknowledge five categories of intellectual
property rights: patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and
industrial designs.5 9 In the landmark case In re Charles S. Loeb
Pipes, Inc., in which a federal circuit court passed on the issue, the

57. See Jim Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellations of Origin: How the
United States Will Crash France's Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 29, 36-37 (1996) (relating that the French Code de la Consommation,
grants producers a) the privilege of producing and marketing protected goods; b) a
right of action that allows producers to petition the government for injunctive
relief, thereby prohibiting competitors from using the controlled geographic
indicator; c) the capacity to challenge the government's decision to withhold an
Appellation d'OrigineControlke where the producer feels that he or she produces
the good in compliance with existing standards of production (akin to a right of
appeal); and d) immunity from the degeneration of an appellation into
genericism.). Chen describes this mechanism as encompassing "the full panoply of
Hohfeldian interests in property." Id.
58. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that the Anglo-American tradition
does not grant producers a proprietary right to certification marks); see also
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 136 (relating that the United States has not traditionally
invested geographical indicators with "cultural or economic importance"); Jenny
Mosca, The Battle Between the Cheeses Signifies the Ongoing Struggle to Protect
Designationsof Origin Within the European Community and in the United States
in Consorzio per la Tutella del Formaggio Gorgonzola v. Kaserei Champignon
Hoffmeister GMBH & Co. KG, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 559, 591 (2000)
(concluding that U.S. law shows "'little respect' for geographical indicators, and
finding it "unlikely" that U.S. law will ever fully acknowledge the French system
of Appellations d'OrigineControle).
59. See Doris Long & Richard Bilder, Recent Books on InternationalLaw, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 755, 756 (2002) (listing the five forms of intellectual property that
most international intellectual property regimes have traditionally acknowledged);
see also Doris E. Long, Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawyers! Musings
on the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 851, 853 n.6 (2001) (explaining that most legal regimes limit definitions of
intellectual property to "broader categories of traditionally acknowledged
intellectual property forms," including patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade
secrets, and industrial designs, or the "same five categories that were the historic
focus of both domestic and international protection regimes").
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court held unequivocally that producers may not claim an exclusive
property right to geographic indicators.60
D. A MECHANISM OF UNITED STATES LAW

This section introduces the reader to portions of U.S. statutory law
implicated in the current dispute. 61 Applicable provisions appear in
labeling laws that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
("ATF") administers 62 and the Lanham Trademark Act of July 5,
1946 and subsequent amendments that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") administers. 63 TRIPs does not, in
itself, set up a body of international intellectual property law.64
Instead, the Agreement, like all GATT accords, compels Member
nations to adjust their domestic laws so that those laws comply with
its the parameters. 65 Thus, TRIPs provides no guidance as to
procedures. 66 Consequently, the state of applicable U.S. law is an allimportant consideration.67
60. See In re Charles S. Loeb Pipes,Inc. 190 U.S.P.Q. 238, 242 (TTAB 1975)
(holding that producers may not claim the exclusive right to a geographic indicator
"so as to preclude others ... from truthfully representing.., that their goods or
services originate from the same place and from using the geographic term in
connection with such goods or services").
61. See infra Part I.D (commenting on those portions of U.S. law that concern
the protection of geographic indicators).
62. See Generic, Semi-generic, and Non-Generic Designations of Geographic
Significance, 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (2004) (establishing categories of protection for
geographic indicators based upon a determination by "an appropriate ATF
officer").
63. See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1997) (governing
the application for the use of trademarks).
64. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22 (stating that "Members shall provide the
legal means for interested parties to prevent" those uses of geographic indicators
that TRIPs prevents); see also Stephen E. Bondura & Lloyd G. Farr, Intellectual
Property Rights Abroad and at Home after GATT, 7 S.C. LAW. 20, 20 (1995)
(indicating that the GATT itself does not establish a regime of international
intellectual property law).
65. See supra text accompanying note 64 (explaining that GATT does not set
up substantive laws, but requires Member states to align their domestic law with
GATT mandates).
66. See Bondura & Farr, supra note 64, at 22 (relating that TRIPs goes no
further than to require Members to set up their own national regime, and does not
establish any international procedural mechanisms, such as a patent filing system
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ATF regulations deal only with wine68 and offer three tiers of
protection for geographical indicators, 69 dependent upon whether a
ATF official 70decides that the term is "generic," "semi-generic," or
"nongeneric." "Generic" terms receive no protection.71 Producers
from outside a traditional producing region can use "semi-generic"
terms if the packaging also discloses the good's true origin, and so
long as the newcomer comports with the corresponding "standard of
identity" or "trade understanding. "72
or registry). Later, these authors explain that TRIPs requires Member countries to
establish "minimum intellectual property protection levels" for geographical
indicators, and that Members must "provide means for parties to prevent use of
product descriptions" that fall under Articles 22-24. Id. at 22-23. See also Conrad,
supra note 3, at 30 (explaining that the E.C. countries, some of which had
advocated an international registry of geographic indicators under the failed Lisbon
Agreement, consciously chose to avoid the establishment of any similar apparatus
under TRIPs). He goes on to suggest that although this made TRIPs "easier for the
many nations whose legal tradition was not familiar with the protection of
geographic indications," the inherent absence of a registry may have led to the
current dispute. Id. at 30-31. Unlike previous multilateral agreements covering
geographic indicators, however, TRIPs Articles 22-24 do set forth certain
substantive standards for the protection of intellectual property. Id. at 31. Conrad
notes that the imposition of substantive standards for the international protection of
international law under TRIPs is an innovation, and that the Paris Convention,
Madrid Agreement, and Lisbon Agreement contained no such "enforcement
promise." Id.
67. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 135 (stating that "considerable differences
found in the legal systems of Member countries is a problem that constantly
plagues multinational agreements").
68. See Chen, supra note 57, at 42 (noting that, whereas the French system of
Appellations d'Origine Control~e covers a substantial variety of food and drink,
U.S. law covers only wine).
69. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (contemplating three levels of protection for
geographic indicators based upon the determinations of an ATF official).
70. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1) (establishing different levels of
protection for "generic," "semi-generic," and "nongeneric" geographic indicators
based upon consumer perceptions). Dependent upon the judgment of the
"appropriate" ATF officer, the law states that producers can use false or inaccurate
indicators in certain circumstances. Id. § 4.24(b)(1). By contrast, producers may
not falsely or inaccurately use "nongenerics," but such protection will apply only if
the ATF official determines that consumers understand the indicator to designate a
specific wine deriving from a certain region. Id. § 4.24(c)(1).
71. See id. § 4.24(a)(1) (establishing, by omission, that generic indicators do
not receive any protection under the ATF regulations).
72. See id. § 4.24(b)(1) (contemplating uses in which producers may use
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Thus, producers may call a product "California Chablis" or
"American Champagne," provided the "appropriate" ATF officer
determines that those indications are "semi-generic," and that the
products' characteristics approximate those qualities that comprise
the "standard of identity" of Chablis or Champagne. 73 "Nongeneric"
terms can only indicate wines "of the origin indicated by such
name."7 4 Whether or not a product receives protection as a nongeneric turns on an individual official's assessment of the American
consumer's subjective perspective.7 5
The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 is the general federal statute
dealing with trademarks.7 6 Comprehensive revisions to the Lanham
Act took effect in November 1989, and policymakers have since
amended the Act pursuant to trade negotiations.77 Applicable
provisions do not protect indicators if the mark is merely
"misdescriptive" of a good's place of origin. 8 Only if the "primary
"semi-generics"); see also Maher, supra note 21, at 1906 (concluding that these
provisions "ultimately" represent Congress' decision that wine labels should not
mislead American consumers).
73. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 39 (providing two examples of "semi-generic"
indicators, which producers may use under 27 C.F.R. § 4.24(b)(1), provided the
terms appear in conjunction with some indication of a good's true origin); see also
Chen, supra note 57, at 50 (furnishing "California champagne" as an example of
one use of a geographic indicator that the ATF laws do not prohibit).
74. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24(c)(1) (noting that "such name" is not necessarily the
correct designation of the wine).
75. See Chen, supra note 57, at 50 (indicating that whether a producer enjoys
exclusive rights to the name "Chablis" or "Champagne," for example, depends
upon whether the trade name has become generic in the United States).
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (noting that the statute deals generally with
the application and registration process for trademarks and proscribes their
misappropriation).
77. See Anne Hiaring, Basic Principlesof TrademarkLaw, 759 PRACTICING. L.
INST. 51, 54 (2003) (relating that the Lanham Trademark Act has been amended
pursuant to trade negotiations in order to align U.S. laws with foreign trademark
law).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(l)-(3) (stating that any trademark which serves to
distinguish one producer's good from another is eligible for protection under the
statute unless it "[c]onsists of a mark which.., is merely descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive"). However, "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive" marks do trigger the statute's protections. Id. See also Maher,
supra note 21, at 1889 (noting that the test for trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act is the "likelihood of consumer confusion" test).
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significance" 9 of the mark is the false or inaccurate denotation of an
actual geographic place, and if consumers subjectively infer a
mistaken "goods/place association" from a false or inaccurate
geographical indicator, do the Act's protections take effect.8 0
Another portion of the statute allows parties to register geographic
indicators with the USPTO, entitling them to the same protection as
trademarks.81 However, this level of protection is only available if
the term is "distinctive ...in connection with the applicant's goods

in commerce," which claimants must show by proof of five years of
"substantially exclusive and continuous use."82
Congress amended applicable ATF laws under the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 199711 in response to TRIPs Articles 2311 and 24.81

79. See Brody, supra note 36, at 522 (pointing out that legislators retained
Section 2(e) of the Lanham Act through revisions, and explaining that the element
of "primarily" geographically misdescriptive requires that parties show a false
"goods/place" association in order to block the registration of the indicator).
Parties may register even a false or inaccurate geographical indicator, provided the
public does not wrongly link the corresponding good to an actual geographic
source. Id. Brody also notes that the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") requires Member countries to prohibit the registration of any
geographic indicators that may be "misleading" to consumers, and that it is as
unclear under that agreement as it is under TRIPs exactly how the Lanham Act's
"misleading" standard conditions the United States' obligations. Id. at 523, 526.
He also explains that, in response to the conclusion of NAFTA, the United States
did not amend the laws as they exist under 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(l)-(3), but instead
argued that the "primariness" standard enunciated in federal circuit case law
brought the ATF regulations into compliance. Id. at 526. Brody also notes that
whether or not the Lanham Act and the associated decisional gloss is NAFTA- or
TRIPs-consistent "remains an open question," but posits that the drafters of TRIPs
did not intend to circumscribe the scope of the "misleading" language in TRIPs
Article 22(2)(a) and 22(3) through the use of this "primariness" test. Id.
80. See In re Socit Gen~rale des Eaux Min&ales de Vittel, SA, 824 F.2d 957,
959 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (establishing a two-pronged test for determining whether a
mark is "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" for purposes of 15
U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(3)).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (making indicators "registrable... in the same
manner and with the same effect as are trademarks").
82. Id. § 1052(0.
83. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 910 (1997)
(regulating the designation of wines and the use of semi-generic designations).
84. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(1) (requiring Member states to provide the
"legal means" for the protection of geographical indicators for wines and spirits).
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American vintners' lobbying efforts succeeded in shaping this
legislation.86 The Act "clarifies" American producers' ability to use
false or inaccurate geographic indicators,"7 provided the producer
also discloses the product's actual place of origin, and as long as the
American good meets the corresponding "standard of identity" or
"trade understanding. 88 The legislation incorporates verbatim the list
of unprotected "semi-generic" geographic indicators whose nonmisleading use the ATF acknowledged prior to TRIPs. s9 Moreover,
the statute actually takes away the agency's discretionary power to
expand the list of protected "non-generic" geographic indicators. 90
85. See id. art. 24(1) (compelling Member states to conduct negotiations
directed towards improving their protection of geographic indicators as Article 23
defines them).
86. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 327-28 (noting the influence of
Washington, D.C.'s powerful wine lobby, which justified its actions on the
supposed basis of consumer protection motives).
87. See S. REP. No. 105-33, at 75 (1997) (memorializing the Senate Finance
Committee's conclusion that the Treasury Department regulations concerning the
use of "semi-generic" indicators should be put into law "to add clarity to the
existing Code provisions" under 4.24(b) of Title 27 of the Code of Federal
Regulations); see also Brody, supra note 34, at 980 (indicating that, while the
report of the Finance Committee referred to a need for "clarity," the bill that the
committee sent to the Senate floor was identical to § 4.24(b) of Title 27 of the
Code of Federal Regulations). The only substantial modification was a provision
that withdrew the Secretary of the Treasury's power to reclassify "semi-generic"
indicators as "non-generic." Id. at 981-82.
88. 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c)(1)(B).
89. See id. § 5388(c)(2)(B) (listing Angelica, Burgundy, Claret, Chablis,
Champagne, Chianti, Malaga, Marsala, Madeira, Moselle, Port, Rhine Wine (syn.
Hock), Sauterne, Haut Sauterne, Sherry, and Tokay); see also Brody, supra note
34, at 980 (explaining that 26 U.S.C. § 5388 repeats word-for-word the list of
"semi-generic" geographic indicators that the ATF acknowledged under section
4.24(b) of Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
90. See id. Brody, supra note 36, at 981-82 (arguing that Congress intended to
suspend the ATF's authority to add to the list of "non-generic," protected
indicators while maintaining the agency's ability to add terms to the list of
unprotected "semi-generic" indicators). Previously, the ATF had the discretionary
authority to increase protection for "semi-generics" by listing them as "nongeneric." Id. at 983. Following the 1997 legislation, such reclassification requires
an independent act of Congress. Id. at 984; see also Lindquist, supra note 20, at
332 (explaining that before the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the
ATF could amend the applicable regulations without Congressional action in order
to bring the United States in line with the GATTIWTO, and that the new
legislation confounds compliance with TRIPs by introducing considerable
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Furthermore, the new legislation allows any producer who has
permissibly used a geographic indicator to continue using it,
regardless of how long he or she has done so.9' It is also noteworthy
that the United States did not amend applicable provisions of the
Lanham Act in response to TRIPs.9 The result is that the flimsy
"misleading" test 93 is still the only source of protection rights holders
receive under U.S. trademark law. 94
E. E.U. MEMBER STATES' EFFORTS TO PROTECT GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATORS BEFORE TRIPs

The European Union has struggled over the same issues that
characterize the current controversy between "New World" and "Old
World" producers. 95 In 1978, the European Commission sued the
legislative impediments). Lindquist concludes that the 1997 legislation makes it
more difficult for U.S. trade officials to negotiate for enhanced protections in the
course of trade negotiations. Id.
91. See 26 U.S.C. § 5388 (lacking any requirement that a producer must have
used a geographic indicator for a certain term before becoming eligible for an
exception).
92. See Brody, supra note 36, at 533 (urging that U.S. trademark law and
policy need revision in order to comply with TRIPs, and noting that the law
continues to permit parties to register literally false or inaccurate geographic
indicators as long as they are not "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive").
93. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80 (explaining that the test assesses
whether a false or inaccurate indicator is "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive," which would violate the test, or "merely descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive," which would pass).
94. See Brody, supra note 36, at 527 (relating that, should a WTO Member
state complain that the United States has not amended the Lanham Act in order to
align the applicable law with TRIPs, the United States will probably argue that
those portions of the Act that apply the "misleading" test for geographical
indicators render the Act compliant, as they did in response to NAFTA).
95. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 572 (noting that the issue of whether a right
holder in one European country may vindicate that right throughout the European
Community has caused considerable conflict within the Community). Elsewhere,
Mosca refers to the tension throughout the Community resulting from clashes
between "an internal market interested in abolishing obstacles to the free
movement of goods and the simultaneous, and equally important, need to provide a
system of registration of geographical indications and designations of origin that
will confer protection in every Member State." Id. at 589. But see Chen, supra note
57, at 38-39 (maintaining that E.C. law guarantees Appellations d'Origine
Control~e to the same extent as French law, and substantiating this argument by
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French government in the ECJ,96 alleging violations of portions of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("E.C.
Treaty").97 The Court held that products are "similar" for purposes of
determining compliance with national treatment if the goods "meet
the same needs from the point of view of consumers." 91
Three years prior, the Commission sued the West German
government under similar circumstances.9 9 The ECJ held that laws
that protect geographic indicators as property are invalid under the
E.C. Treaty unless the area from which a good emanates endows it
with specific attributes, thus, making it distinct from all other

reference to the fact that the Community's definition of Appellations d'Origine
varies little from the French definition).
96. See Case C-168/78, Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 347,
29 (explaining that the French tax system placed cereal-derived alcohol, almost all
of which France imported, at a trade disadvantage by withholding the imposition
of any tax on wine and fruit-derived spirits, a "main domestic product"). The
French government argued that the two categories of spirits were not so similar as
26, 31-34. More specifically, the
to render their tax structure discriminatory. Id.
French government maintained that the products were different enough to save
their tax structure from Article 95 of the E.C. Treaty because they were typically
flavored differently, production involved the use of different raw materials, and
based upon the distinct habits of consumption characteristic of each category of
liqueur. Id. 31-34.
97. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 9, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1) O.J. (C91) 2 (1992) (as amended by the Treaty on
European Union) Article 9(1) (requiring the removal of import/export duties
among the Members and erecting a common tariff toward non-Members),
available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm (last visited Mar.
27, 2004). Read together with Article 95, which includes language prohibiting
taxation "as to afford indirect protection to other products," charges having
"equivalent effect" to tariffs, these provisions bar domestic measures that have the
effect of inhibiting the competitive position of imported goods imported from
Member States. Id. arts. 9, 95.
98. Case C-168/78, Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 347, 2.
99. See Case C-12/74, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1975
E.C.R. 181, "Grounds" 2 (ruling on whether a West German regulatory scheme
was E.C. Treaty-compliant). The regulation required that sixty percent of all grapes
used in the production of a certain wine be German-grown, and that the
corresponding appellation be reserved to wine produced in countries whose official
language was German. Id. The scheme also allowed producers of sparkling whites
made according to traditional production methods to use certain well-respected
indicators, but required those who produced wine from grapes originating in a nonGerman-speaking country to use a diminutive appellation. Id.
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products.'00 In a parallel case, the ECJ held that Members could not
restrict the importation of other states' wines if those states bottled
02
their wines consistently with accepted methods.' In another case,1
the ECJ stated that any national law having the effect of impeding
the free movement of goods must serve to advance both fairness in
trade and public health in order to be consistent with the European
Community treaty.' 03
In 1988, the ECJ invalidated a French law that restricted the
importation and marketing of German "Edam" cheese.0 4 The court
held that national regulations obstructing trade were presumptively
incompatible with the E.C. Treaty if they restricted the movement of
goods "lawfully manufactured and marketed" under the same
appellation in other E.C. countries.0 5 The court also held that it
would tolerate impediments to free trade only to the extent that

7-8 (stating that a good must have certain qualities which are
100. See id.
attributable to its specific place of origin, conferring distinguishing characteristics
that sets the good apart in order to enjoy protection as property under the E.C.
Treaty).
101. See Case C-16/83, Criminal Proceedings Against Karl Pranti, 1984 E.C.R.
1299, 35 (ruling that rights holders may not vindicate a property interest in an
indicator against producers in a non-traditional producing region observing
practices that are "fair and traditional" in their own state). Thus, if a practice in
country B, whose producers emulate country A's customary production methods,
is "fair and traditional" as well as similar to processes in country A, claims by
producers in country A to proprietary rights to a geographical indicator must fail.

Id.
102. See Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 2 (noting that the plaintiff in the main action tried
to bring a shipment of French-made "Cassis de Dijon" into West Germany, but
confronted a law imposing a minimum alcohol content requirement, which the
French liqueur failed to meet). The West German rules barred the import of fruit
liqueurs that did not have an alcohol content of twenty-five percent or greater;
Cassis de Dijon typically contains between fifteen and twenty percent. Id. 3.
103. See id. 8 (holding that national marketing laws that have the effect of
impeding the free movement of goods must promote public health and fairness to
producers in order to comport with the E.C. Treaty).
104. See Case C-286/86, Ministere Public v. Gerard Deserbais, 1988 E.C.R.
4907, 2 (explaining that the French law targeted Edam with a fat content of less
than forty percent, and that the German cheese contained just over thirty-four
percent fat).
19 (requiring that consumers also be provided with proper
105. See id.
information).
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national regulations advance the interests of fair-trading and
consumer protection, 10 6 thereby underscoring its holding in the West
German fruit liqueur case."'
F. PREVIOUS MULTILATERAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT GEOGRAPHIC
INDICATORS

Past European-led attempts to establish multilateral protection
illustrate the difficulties associated with applying intellectual
property concepts to geographic indicators at the international
level." 8 The first attempt was the 1883 Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention")." 9 One
hundred seventeen countries agreed to the original Paris
Convention,"l 0 which proscribed only the fraudulent appropriation of
geographic indicators."' In 1958, the United States succeeded in
106. See id. (establishing that countries may only justify national measures that
obstruct trade based on a provision's ability to advance the interests of both
producers and consumers).
107. See Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
14 (finding that West Germany's minimum
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649,
alcohol content requirement did not prevail over the principle of the free
movement of goods, and stating that no goods could be targeted by such laws
"provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the
Member States").
108. See discussion infra Part I.F (evaluating previous multilateral attempts to
extend intellectual property protections to geographic indicators in order to isolate
certain failings).
109. See Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 10bis (proscribing trade and
marketing practices that create confusion with competitors' business interests, and
prohibiting untrue representations, that "in the course of trade," do a disservice to
the business concerns of competitors or can mislead the public as to the qualities of
a competitor's goods).
110. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 112 (noting the "large number of [M]ember
states"); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 22 n.62 (stating that as of January 1,
1996, the Paris Convention had 136 Members).
111. See Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 10 (prohibiting the "direct or
indirect use of a false indication of the identity of the producer, manufacturer or
merchant"); see also Lindquist, supra note 20, at 314 (explaining that, in its
original form, the Paris Convention only barred the use of geographic indicators or
appellations of origin in cases of "serious fraud"); see generally Goldberg, supra
note 2, at 112 (describing the original Paris Convention as affording only "limited
protection" of indications of source, failing to define the conditions of protection,
and prohibiting only "cases of serious fraud"). Goldberg argues that this is the only
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pressuring the parties to revise the applicable portions of the Paris
Convention."2 Following the revision, the Paris Convention only
prohibited uses of geographic indicators that were absolutely false or
misleading. 13
The next multilateral effort to protect geographic indicators was
the 1891 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive
Indications of Source on Goods ("Madrid Agreement")."I4 Unlike the
Paris Convention in its original or post-1958 form,"'5 the Madrid
Agreement proscribes the use of misleading geographical
indications," 6 and prohibits Members from allowing geographical
indicators to become generic without a decision by a national
court." 7 Valid wine appellations may never lose protection." 8 The
reason the United States agreed to the Paris Convention. Id.
112. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 112-13 (maintaining that the 1958 revision
of Article 10 of the Paris Convention took place "at the prodding of the United
States").
113. See Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 10bis(2)-(3) (prohibiting "false
allegations in the course of trade" and "indications or allegations the use of which
in the course of trade is liable to mislead"); see also Goldberg, supra note 2, at
112-13 (relating that the parties added Article 10bis(3) in 1958, concerning unfair
competition, in order to prohibit the use of geographic indicators "liable to mislead
the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics,the
suitability for their purpose, or the quality of the goods," but the word
"characteristics"replaced "the origin" in response to pressure from the United
States delegation) (emphasis added). This limited the Paris Convention's scope to
the prohibition of absolutely false indications of source. Id. at 113.
114. See Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications
of Source on Goods, Apr. 14, 1891, as amended July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement] (proscribing the false or deceptive
use of indicators which suggest that a good originated in the territory of a Member
state, and granting national courts the discretion to determine whether an indicator
has degenerated into genericism, except in the case of wines), available at
http://www.paragon.com.tr/agreements/05_MadridAgreement.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2004).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 109, 111, 113 (explaining that the
Paris Convention proscribed the use of geographic indicators or appellations of
origin only in instances of blatant fraud).
116. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 114, art. 1(1) (mandating that "[a]ll
goods bearing a false or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to
which this Agreement applies, or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly
indicated as being the country or place of origin shall be seized on importation into
any of the said countries").
117. See id. art. 4 (stating that "courts of each country shall decide what
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Agreement thus prohibits even the non-misleading use of an
indicator," 9 such as "Roquefort-style cheese."' 20 As of 1996, only
thirty-one states had joined the agreement;' 2' the United States is not
among them.

22

The last attempt to protect geographic indicators multilaterally
prior to TRIPs was the 1958 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of
Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration ("Lisbon
Agreement").2 3 The Lisbon Agreement establishes a protective
definition for geographic indicators,'24 and contemplates a system
appellations, on account of their generic character, do not fall within the provisions
of this Agreement, regional appellations concerning the source of products of the
vine being, however, excluded from the reservation specified by this Article").
118. See id. (establishing an exception to the provision that national courts can
decide which appellations have degenerated into genericism for "regional
appellations concerning the source of products of the vine").
119. See supra text accompanying note 116 (pointing out that Article 1(1) of the
Madrid Agreement requires the seizure of "[a]ll goods bearing a false...
indication," as opposed to just "deceptive" indicators, which the agreement does
not actually attempt to define).
120. See Conrad, supra note 3, n.75 (furnishing the example of"Roquefort-style
cheese" in order to illustrate the use of a term that may fall under the prohibitions
of Article 1(1) of the Madrid Agreement).
121. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 113 (relating that thirty-one states had
signed onto the Madrid Agreement as of 1996).
122. See id. at 113-14 (arguing that the scope of protection the Madrid
Agreement contemplates discouraged the United States and many other countries
from joining); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 25 (stating that the significance of
the Madrid Agreement is "limited" because few nations have joined, and
intimating that "divergent views" regarding the appropriate construction of the
anti-genericism provisions are partially to blame for many countries' refusal to
accede to the accord); Edward Grosek, The MultilateralAgreements That Protect
Trademarks and Marks That Indicate Origins of Source, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 471, 478 (2000) (relating that four Congresses presented seven bills to
implement the Madrid Agreement, all of which failed to pass).
123. See Lisbon Agreement, supra note 24 (providing a discrete definition for
"appellations," establishing a registry and system of notification for terms that
qualify, requiring Members to protect geographic indicators at the level of
protection they enjoy in their country of origin, prohibiting the non-misleading use
of geographic indicators, and proscribing the degeneration of valid indicators into
genericism as long as their country of origin continues to protect them).
124. See id. art. 2(1) (defining appellations of origin for purposes of the
agreement as "the geographical name of a country, region, or locality, which
serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and characteristics of
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whereby Member states register geographic indicators with a central
bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization. 25 Those
geographic indicators that receive protection under the national laws
of their country of origin are eligible for registration. 26
Members must prohibit the use of registered geographic
indicators, even if the labeling discloses the product's true place of
origin or clearly denotes that the indicator is false (for example, by
the use of language such as "imitation" or "style"). 127 Another
portion of the Lisbon Agreement prevents the degeneration of
registered appellations of origin into genericism, provided they
continue to receive protection in their country of origin. 128 As of

which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment,
including natural and human factors").
125. See id. arts. 1(2), 5(l)-(6) (requiring that "appellations of origin of products
[be] ...registered at the International Bureau of Intellectual Property... referred
to in the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization");
see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 26 (contending that the main feature of the
agreement is that geographic indicators are "'recognized and protected as such in
the country of origin and registered at the International Bureau of Intellectual
Property"'). Conrad notes that the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, a multilateral trademark regime, inspires the character of
the registry contemplated in the Lisbon Agreement. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra
note 2, at 114 (referring to Conrad's contention that the "main feature" of the
Lisbon Agreement is its registry, which the author compares to the registration for
trademarks under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks). Goldberg goes on to argue that this evinces the parties' intent to make
the international protection of geographic indicators as robust as international
trademark regimes. Id.
126. See Lisbon Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1(2) (requiring that countries
party to the agreement "undertake to protect on their territories.., the appellations
of origin of products of the other countries... recognized and protected as such in
the country of origin and registered at the International Bureau of Intellectual
Property...") (emphasis added).
127. See id. art. 3 (mandating that "[p]rotection shall be ensured against any
usurpation or imitation, even if the true origin of the product is indicated or if the
appellation is used in translated form or accompanied by terms such as 'kind,'
'type,' 'make,' 'imitation,' or the like"); see also Goldberg, supra note 2, at 115
(noting that art. 3 would prohibit U.S. producers from calling a product "California
Style Champagne," for example).
128. See id. art. 6 (requiring that "[a]n appellation which has been granted
protection in one of the countries. .. cannot, in that country, be deemed to have
become generic, as long as it is protected as an appellation of origin in the country
of origin").
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1996, only seventeen countries were party to the Lisbon Agreement,
29
and the United States was not among them.1

II. ANALYSIS
The principal difficulty confronting past and present efforts to
protect geographical indicators as intellectual property is simply the
"diversity of various national concepts."130 The fact that the relevant
intellectual property protections appear in such a variety of laws in
both Europe and the United States suggests the same conclusion."'
So, too, does the fact that the European Community struggled with
the issue of what end the protection of geographic indicators as
intellectual property can legitimately serve, 13 2 as well as the fate of
the three multilateral attempts to protect geographic indicators that
predate TRIPs. 33
A. CONFLICTING NORMATIVE OBJECTIVES

The TRIPs controversy is fundamentally a collision of
incompatible normative goals.3 4 Scholars argue that European
intellectual property law generally represents producers' interests,
129. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 33 n.66 (indicating that seventeen countries
had signed onto the Lisbon Agreement as of 1996, and that the United States did
not join).
130. See id. at 14 (observing that countries that promote international protection
have systems that address so many approaches that such systems cannot serve as
model laws for the international arena); see also Mosca, supra note 58, at 573
(discussing the tension that has resulted within the European Community from "the
legal diversity of the Member States," particularly vis-A-vis intellectual property
rights).
131. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 582-584 (noting the fact that protective laws
appear in unfair competition laws, trademark laws, advertising and labeling
provisions, food and health regulations, and other "special" measures as evidence
of "legal diversity" regarding intellectual property protection for geographical
indicators within the European Union).
132. See supra notes 100, 103, 106, 107, 111 (demonstrating the clash of E.C.
constituents over the protection of geographic indicators).
133. See infra Part II.C (describing the weaknesses of the Paris Convention, the
Madrid Agreement, and the Lisbon Agreement).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 150-162 (explaining the various
contours of the collision between European and American concepts of intellectual
property law).
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while relevant U.S. laws aim to protect consumers. 3 5 Applicable
U.S. law has traditionally refused to acknowledge the cultural or
economic significance of geographical indications alone,' 36 hesitating
135. See Lori E. Simon, Comment, Appellations of Origin: the Continuing
Controversy, 5 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 132, 135 (1983) (observing that "United
States trade law traditionally has been concerned with protecting the consumer
from deception, whereas French law centers on the interests of the products or
manufacturers and the improper use of their marks by other producers"); see also
Maher, supra note 21, at 1888-89 (explaining that the purpose of a substantial
body of U.S. law dealing with geographic indicators is to prevent the consumer
from deception and to give the consumer sufficient information regarding
products' identity and quality); Mosca, supra note 58, at 595 (citing Simon in
order to underscore her argument that U.S. trade law focuses on the consumer, and
that French law focuses on producers). She also refers to the influence of regional
and religious divisions on notions of intellectual property protection. Id. at 594.
Elsewhere, Mosca points to "divergent agricultural policies." Id. at 594-95. She
also suggests that a conflict between ideas of quality embodied in the system of
Appellations d'OrigineControl6e and U.S. trademark law's concern with security
may also be issues. Id. at 594; see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that
German law has traditionally protected geographical indicators under an unfair
competition act, as opposed to a consumer protection provision). Conrad goes on
to maintain, however, that such provisions are "aimed at protecting the integrity of
trade and the reliance of consumers on true representations concerning origin. The
protection of producers is indirect." Id.; see also Downes, supra note 54, at 271
(maintaining that "[g]eographical indicators ... benefit consumers by providing
them with reliable information and assurances of authenticity"). But see Robert M.
Tobiassen, On Common Ground, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 75, 86 (2000) (contending
that European-led measures designed to enhance international trade inevitably
promote consumer interests by assuring a wider selection of goods and accurate
information about a good's origin, as well as allowing governments to assess
consumer expectations and make informed public health decisions). See generally
Chen, supra note 57, at 33 (maintaining that, although it is difficult to draw
analogies between American intellectual property law as it pertains to the
protection of geographic indicators and the French system of Appellations
d'Origine Control~e, it is evident that the French example advances both the
consumer protection rationale of the United States' Lanham Act and the proproducer "moral rights" rationale that motivates the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and several other regimes that aim to
discourage the dilution of trade names).
136. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 136 (pointing out that the history of the
United States' regime of intellectual property law demonstrates little reverence for
geographical indicators). But see Chen, supra note 57, at 29-31 (arguing that while
the U.S. counterparts to Appellations d'Origine Control~e (AOCs) are
substantially less protective that the original French model, and although the
French system is "alien" to American intellectual property law, the United States'
"pessimistic assessment of French AOCs is not rooted in a cultural or ideological
opposition to this form of intangible property").
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to confer any manner of proprietary right in geographical indicators
until such terms are "invested with meaning from use in
commerce."' 37 The European Union concluded a bilateral accord
with the United States in 1983 that plainly reveals this distinction.
The European Union agreed to allow the importation into Europe of
U.S. wines treated with various additives in exchange for the United
States' commitment to prevent the degeneration of certain "non-

generic" wine designations to "generic" (and hence unprotected)
1 38
status in its regulatory scheme.
The controversy regarding TRIPs' protective regime may have
deeper roots. Some suggest that American opposition to TRIPs
evinces the traditional apprehension with which U.S. trade law views

agricultural cooperatives, that is, as potentially monopolistic. 3 9
137. See Farley, supra note 3, at 76 (relaying that because terms do not have
rights until they become distinctive to consumers as a source indicator, the United
States is reluctant to convey property rights in such terms); see also Maher, supra
note 21, at 1889-90 (explaining that trademark protection is not customarily
available to geographic indicators in American intellectual property jurisprudence
until they have "become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce,"
meaning that the term has taken on meaning that supercedes mere reference to or
description of a geographic place); Norma Dawson, Locating Geographical
Indicators - Perspectives From English Law, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 590, 598
(2000) (describing the Anglo-American tradition as allowing the protection of
some geographic terms "upon proof of distinctiveness," and pointing out that
parties could typically vindicate a right to the use of a term only by showing
"evidence of secondary meaning acquired through use"). She distinguishes this
sort of provision from modem-day, state-sponsored "sui generis intellectual
property right[s]... "Id. at 599.
138. See Letter from John M. Walker, Jr., U.S. Treasury Department, and
Stephen E. Higgins, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, to Leslie Fielding,
Commission of the European Communities (July 26, 1983) (confirming the
parties' official understanding of the wine accord, which encompassed other
agreements, including the EU's decision to acknowledge wine-producing regions
in the United States and agreements concerning the alignment of the United States'
and E.U.'s labeling regulations and cooperation on investigations into the wine
sector),
available
at
http://170.110.214.18/tcc/data/commercehtmli/TCCDocuments/ECWine.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
139. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 594-95 (explaining that the American
judiciary's reluctance to afford farming cooperatives monopoly power sufficient to
"integrate" an entire segment of the agricultural market); see also Chen, supra note
57, at 35-36 (positing that, because the French system of Appellations d'Origine
Controle involves the "farmstead-to-doorstep domination of discrete product
markets" and thus transforms a farmer from economically-vulnerable supplier into
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Others maintain that the present state of intellectual property regimes

is "crafted to protect western European values of individualism and
private property" and that the regimes "ill serve the conflicting
aspirations of native peoples simultaneously to protect and exploit

their heritage and knowledge." 14 0 One writer sees the conflict as a
clash of Protestant and Catholic ideals.141 Another scholar argues that
the fate of international intellectual property law depends upon the
outcome of the TRIPs dispute.1 42 The controversy has, therefore,

become a 1 forum
43
disagreement.

for

deep-seated

historical

and

cultural

B. WHAT DID NOT WORK WITHIN EUROPE UNDER ECJ CASE LAW
WILL NOT WORK BEYOND EUROPE UNDER TRIPS ARTICLES 22-24
One writer argues that E.C. law "undoubtedly protects
[Appellations d'Origine] in their full sense under French law."'" A
a "captain of agribusiness," the system often calls upon the government to shelve
or abrogate the principles of free enterprise). Chen goes on to explain that
"American courts have balked at granting farmers and their cooperatives the
degree of monopoly power needed to integrate an entire line of food processing
into their business portfolios," which, according to this author, is the exact
objective of the French system of controlled ownership of trade names. Id. at 36.
140. See Long & Bilder, supra note 59, at 758-59 (arguing that "the insistence
on private ownership of IP rights ignores communitarian ownership principles,
while the reliance on concepts of technological novelty ... does not value
continuity or tradition -hallmarks of indigenous creativity").
141. See Chen, supra note 57, at 30 (explaining that, while Appellations
d'Origine Controlke are common in Catholic Europe, American examples are
considerably less all-encompassing). Chen goes on to note that Appellations "as
quality control ...

fulfills

. .

. 'Catholic' satisfaction and service objectives." Id. at

35; see also Mosca, supra note 58, at 594 (quoting Veronique Romain Prot,
Origine Geographiqueet Signes de Qualit:Protection Internationale,237 REVUE
DE DROIT RURAL manuscript at 2 (venturing that Protestant, Western European
notions of "quality" favor security and regularity of recognition, while Catholic,
southern European ideals favor "authenticity" and other concepts tied to land and
the quality of a good).
142. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 111 (implying that the future of the ideals
embodied in international intellectual property protection depends upon the
effective resolution of the TRIPs dispute).
143. See discussion supra Parts I.C, II.A (discussing the deeply embedded
differences between the United States' and the European Union's approach to the
protection of geographical indicators as intellectual property).
144. See Chen, supra note 57, at 38 (indicating that "[t]he relevant regulations of

AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.

1208

[19:1181

substantial body of ECJ jurisprudence suggests otherwise.145
Specifically, the ECJ has repeatedly refused to grant producers the
scope and degree of intellectual property protection that the
European Union now asks the WTO to vindicate under TRIPs.' 46
This body of law takes a consistently restrictive view of the extent to
which rights holders can enforce a proprietary interest in geographic
47

terms. 1

In sum, the ECJ explicitly fixed the level of protection it would
afford to consumer perceptions (not the preservation of a competitive
trade environment),141 stated that pro-property laws must advance
public health and safety objectives, 149 enunciated a rule requiring that
the Council of Ministers of the European Union create two regimes governing
appellations of origin").
145. See supra Part I.E (describing the disposition of several ECJ cases in order
to illustrate inter-European conflicts over intellectual property protections for
geographic indicators).
146. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 572 (concluding from a survey of applicable
ECJ case law that a commercial property right holder "may not always be able to
obtain protection, throughout the [European] Community, either because there
exist lawful conflicting rights in another State, or because another State does not
protect the right or imposes differing requirements for recognition of the right").
147. See Case C-168/78, Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 347, 2
(enunciating a standard created from the viewpoint of the consumer); see also
supra text accompanying notes 96-107 (demonstrating that the ECJ is only willing
to vindicate producers' intellectual property rights in geographic indicators to the
extent that the indicators conform to a number of strict criteria); infra text
accompanying notes 169-173 (noting the limited variety of property rights that the
ECJ will uphold in geographic indicators).
148. See supra text accompanying note 147 (holding that consumer perceptions,
as well as similar physical characteristics, govern the inquiry whether imported and
domestic products are sufficiently "similar" to render discriminatory national tax
provisions inconsistent with the E.C. Treaty's underlying principle of equality of
treatment for domestic and imported goods).
149. See supra text accompanying note 103 (establishing that national
legislation that acts as an obstacle to the free movement of goods must further the
objectives of public health and fairness to producers in order to comport with the
E.C. Treaty). Whether this holding requires that a national law further one or both
of these normative objectives is unclear from the language of the case itself. Id.;
see also supra text accompanying note 106 (noting that impediments to the free
movement of goods within the European Community that derive from differing
treatment in the national laws are permissible to the extent that countries are able
to justify them as essential to the "imperative requirements" of consumer
protection and fair trade).
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the region from which a good originates must impart a good with
unique distinguishing characteristics in order for protections to be
treaty-consistent, 5 ' and held that producers located in traditional
producing regions cannot vindicate a proprietary right against
outsiders whose production methods accord with established
techniques.1 5 ' This string of case law evinces a permissive, tradeliberalizing approach' 5 2 to the protection of geographic indicators
that countenances market latecomers' efforts to emulate the qualities
and characteristics of traditional goods.' 53 In this light, TRIPs' proproducer approach appears less like the offshoot of a robust
European legal tradition, and more like a legal innovation that
ignores the most basic normative ends that motivate relevant E.C.
law. 154
C. TRIPs ARTICLES 22-24 WILL (AND SHOULD) FAIL FOR THE
SAME REASONS THAT PAST MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS FAILED
One writer maintains that TRIPs is "the better alternative to the

virtually ineffective international agreements on intellectual property

150. See supra text accompanying note 100 (setting up a standard whereby the

ECJ will only uphold legal measures aimed at the protection of geographic
indicators if the corresponding good has unique attributes owing to its specific
geographical origin which make it distinct from all other goods).
15 1. See supra text accompanying note 101 (ruling that the ECJ will not enforce
a property right to a geographic indicator if competitors from outside a traditional
producing region employ customary production methods that are "identical or
similar" to traditional processes, and if the competitor's goods comply with local
standards of quality in his or her country). The methods producers use outside a
good's traditional place of origin must only be "identical or similar" to traditional
methods, as well as "fair and traditional." Id.
152. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 573 (referring to another ECJ decision in
which the court held that national laws that afford intellectual property protection
to geographic indicators cannot be arbitrary or amount to a loosely veiled trade
restriction).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 103, 106, 147- 152 (demonstrating
the ECJ's unwillingness to vindicate property rights in geographic indicators
unless the property right satisfies certain restrictive criteria, and refusing to allow
national laws to discriminate against goods which meet standards of quality and
whose production embodies traditional methods of production).
154. See discussion infra Part II.C.l (highlighting the failures of the TRIP's
approach as applied).
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that preceded it."'
This writer disagrees: while TRIPs is
substantially different from previous efforts to protect geographical
indicators,'56 it nevertheless exhibits many of the same flaws that
burdened earlier agreements, and should fail as a result.'57
Even before the United States effectively stripped Article l0bis of
the Paris Convention in 1958 of much of its force,158 the protections
available under that agreement were rather narrow. 5 9 The Paris
Convention does not define geographic indicators and fails to
establish substantive standards for determining whether the use of a
geographic indicator is misleading.'6 0 Currently, the only standard for
determining whether a false or inaccurate geographic indicator falls

155. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 584 (explaining that even without complete
U.S. compliance or criticism that certain sections have attracted, TRIPs still has
legitimacy).
156. See Long & Bilder, supra note 59, at 756 (contending that, although
arguments in favor of establishing international protections for intellectual
property reach back well into the nineteenth century, TRIPs "radically altered the
nature of the debate over international protection"). Long and Bilder continue that,
in spite of the appearance of "facial antiquity" that the existence of past
multilateral efforts to protect geographic indicators creates, the modern-day
intellectual property protection on the international level dates from the beginning
of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations in the 1980s. Id at 756; see also
Lindquist, supra note 20, at 315 (concluding, after her discussion of the Paris
Convention, Madrid Agreement, and Lisbon Agreement, that the international
community did not afford protection for geographic indicators before the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations in 1994).
157. See discussion infra Part II.C (indicating those flaws that TRIPs has in
common with the Madrid Agreement and the Lisbon Agreement).
158. See supra text accompanying note 112 (describing how the United States
pressed for the revision of Article 10bis(3) of the Paris Convention in 1958, and
succeeded in relegating the applicability of those provisions affording protection to
geographic indicators to egregiously fraudulent cases).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 111 (pointing out that the Paris
Convention proscribed only the seriously fraudulent use of geographic indicators,
even in its original form); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 24 (concluding that the
Paris Convention's protection of geographic indicators is "very limited").
160. See supra text accompanying note 38 (lacking a definition of geographic
indicators for purposes of the Paris Convention and omitting any guidance as to
how a fact-finder should determine whether or not a false or inaccurate geographic
indicator is misleading); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 24 (pointing out that the
Paris Convention does not define "indication of origin" and that it fails even to
establish "when a representation is false"). He later discusses the substantive
deficiencies of the agreement's "misleading" language. Id. at 24-25.
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under the Paris Convention's protective regime is the "liable to
mislead" language of l0bis(3).' 6' The Paris Agreement consequently
proscribes only egregious fraud.1 62 Although TRIPs' overall
protections are certainly more robust, Articles 22(2)(a) and 22(3),
which apply generally to goods that satisfy TRIPs' definition of
geographical indicators, suffer from the same substantive weakness
63
as commensurate portions of the Paris Convention. 1
The producer-states sought a more protective arrangement under
the Madrid Agreement, 64 the most notable innovations of which
65
were its prohibition of non-misleading geographical indications
and its anti-genericism regime. 66 This agreement failed to attract
more than thirty-one countries due to controversy over Article 4,167

161. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 113 (illustrating that whether or not
the Paris Convention's protective regime applies depends upon whether the use of
a geographic indicator is "liable to mislead," and that the agreement provides no
more guidance as to how to apply this test).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 113 (noting that the Paris
Agreement only proscribes seriously fraudulent uses of false or inaccurate
geographic indicators).
163. See discussion infra Part II.E (illustrating that TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a) and
22(3) consist of a "likely to mislead" standard akin to the Paris Convention
10bis(3)'s "liable to mislead" language, while TRIPs Article 23(1) contemplates a
rule that does not turn on consumer perception).
164. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 314-15 (intimating that the Paris
Convention's limited prohibition of false indications of source, producer,
manufacturer or merchant only in egregious cases led many parties to that
agreement to seek "more precise protection" under the Madrid Agreement).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 119 (demonstrating that the
Madrid Agreement calls upon Members to seize all goods that display a false or
inaccurate geographic indicator).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118 (delegating to national courts
the task of determining what appellations have degenerated into generic, and hence
unprotected, status, except in the case of wine appellations, which may never
degenerate).
167. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 113-14 (arguing that very few countries
joined the Madrid Agreement because of its expanded protective regime, notably
Article 4, which she calls a "controversial area of protection"). She also points out
that Article 3's proscription of non-misleading uses of geographic indicators also
discouraged countries from joining and that, cumulatively, the enhanced level of
protection available under Articles 3 and 4 prevented the United States from
signing onto the agreement. Id.; see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 25 (suggesting
that differing viewpoints on the construction of Article 4 of the Madrid Agreement
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which permits national courts to decide when an indicator has
degenerated due to the status of a generic in all cases except valid
wine appellations.' 68 TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a), 22(3), and 23(1) affect
the same substantive inequality between the levels of protection
available to wines and to "other" products, albeit with less candor
than Madrid Article 4, but TRIPs also privileges spirits over other
169
regionally distinct goods.
Unlike both the Paris Convention and the Madrid Agreement,'7"
the Lisbon Agreement features a self-contained definition for
"'
The agreement adopts the highly
geographic indicators.17
72
French interpretation of "Appellations d'Origine
protective
Controle." 73 Additionally, Article 1(2) requires that Members
afford geographic indicators the same level of protection they receive
in their country of origin, subject to an unrestrictive registration
requirement.174 Article 6 parallels this provision, allowing
have prevented more parties from joining); Dawson, supra note 137, at 604 (urging
that the Madrid Agreement and the Lisbon Agreement compel countries to
acknowledge and protect geographic indicators that have become generic in their
territory "because they continued to be valid and non-generic in their territories of
origin"). She goes on to note that these agreements enjoy very limited membership
because of such provisions. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118, 166 (explaining that Article 4
of the Madrid Agreement permits national courts to determine whether a
geographic indicator has degenerated to the status of a generic for all products
except wine appellations).
169. See discussion infra Part II.E (describing the disparity of protection
available under TRIPs Article 22's "misleading test," which applies to all goods
that qualify for protection under TRIPs, and TRIPs Article 23's more robust level
of protection, which applies only to wines and spirits).
170. See Paris Convention, supra note 38 (lacking a definition for geographic
indicators); see also Madrid Agreement, supra note 111 (failing to define either an
"indication" under Article 1 or an "appellation" under Article 4).
171. See supra text accompanying note 124 (defining "appellation of origin"
essentially as the name of a traditional producing region which denotes that a
product came from that region and possesses certain distinct attributes that
traditional processes impart on the good).
172. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 25 (explaining that the Lisbon Agreement
represents an effort to establish "effective and enforceable protection of
geographical indications on a new basis").
173. See id. at 26 (stating conclusively that Lisbon Agreement Article 2(l)'s
definition of geographic indicators takes up "the French interpretation").
174. See supra text accompanying note 126 (noting the requirement that each
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degeneration only if it takes place in the indicator's country of
origin. "75
Thus, if a Member country protects an appellation through any
legal means and registers it with the World Intellectual Property
Organization, all other parties to the agreement must extend
protection to the term "in accordance with this agreement. ' 7 6 By
way of redundancy, Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement requires that
Members prohibit any "usurpation or imitation," even if the
product's actual place of origin is evident from the packaging or if
language demonstrating that the product came from elsewhere
accompanies the geographic indicator. 7 7 This provision is
substantively intrusive, imposing upon Member states' regulatory
sovereignty." 8 Because the agreement prohibits even the nonmisleading use of geographic indicators 7 9 and only allows a term to
degenerate internationally if it becomes generic in the country of
Member state protect geographic indicators as the country that encompasses the
traditional producing region protects them).
175. See supra text accompanying note 128 (pointing out that Article 6 of the
Lisbon Agreement establishes a rule whereby indicators which continue to receive
protection in their country of origin cannot become generic under the Lisbon
Agreement).
176. Paris Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(2).
177. See supra text accompanying note 127 (citing Article 3 of the Lisbon
Agreement as extending protection to any use of a geographic indicator by
producers outside a traditional producing region, even if the packaging
demonstrates the good's true origin or features language that clearly shows that the
good is not from the traditional source).
178. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that countries' inability to continue
protecting geographic indicators through, for example, their unfair competition
laws or advertising regulations under the Lisbon Agreement has prevented many
from joining, and adding that "a number of states are not willing to transform their
system of protection in order to be compatible with the standards of the Lisbon
Agreement"). Elsewhere, he states that "[d]espite its high standard (or perhaps
because of it) even fewer countries have adhered to the Lisbon Agreement." Id. at
23; see also Lindquist, supra note 20, at 315 (calling the Lisbon Agreement's
requirements "burdensome," and pointing out that the agreement only has
seventeen signatories).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 177 (requiring that Member states
protect "any usurpation or imitation" of other Members' geographic indicators,
even if the labeling discloses the good's actual source or uses the indicator in
conjunction with terms that clearly indicate that the product comes from outside
the traditional source).
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origin, 180 the Lisbon Agreement renders consumer perceptions
irrelevant and disregards the diversity of normative ends that
regimes. 8 ' This is also
motivate different countries' protective 182
TRIPs' most basic and most damning flaw.
Another deficiency that TRIPs shares in common with other failed
agreements appears in TRIPs Article 22(1), or rather, does not appear
in Article 22(1).183 Traditionally, under both U.S. and European law,
some significant connection had to exist between a good and its
source in order for the corresponding geographic indicator to receive
protection as intellectual property. 8 4 Those geographic influences
that may qualify an indicator for protection include "geographical
environment, including natural and human factors,"185 region-specific
grape varieties, viticultural practices, soil, subsoil and "climate
environment." 186 TRIPs Article 22(1) affords protection "where a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin." '8 7 This provides
no guidance as to what sort of nexus must exist between a product
and its source to bring the good within the ambit of the Agreement. 88
180. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 175 (explaining that Article 6 of
the Lisbon Agreement prohibits Member countries from treating an indicator as a
generic if the term still enjoys protection under the traditional source country's
intellectual property regime).
181. See supra Part II.A (describing the varying normative approaches to
protecting geographic indicators as intellectual property).
182. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 23 (arguing that the Lisbon Agreement's high
level of protection "has now been taken as one of the models for... TRIPs
provisions").
. 183. See supra text accompanying note 35 (demonstrating that geographic
indicators are only valid under TRIPs if some undefined nexus exists between the
corresponding good's distinctive attributes and its origin).
184. See supra text accompanying note 24 (describing the character of various
influences that a region had to impart on a good in order for the corresponding
indicator to receive protection as an "appellation of origin").
185. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 24, art. 2.
186. See WTO and the Clash, supra note 24 (listing additional influences that
must endow a product with unique qualities for the corresponding indicator to
receive protection under the archetypal French system of "produitsde terroir").
187. TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (emphasis added).
188. See Dawson, supra note 137, at 611 (pointing out that the notion of
"reputation" that TRIPs Article 22 uses to link geographic indicator and the quality
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TRIPs Article 22(1) consciously draws on Article 2 of the Lisbon
Agreement, 89 which also lacks substantive standards in this area. 90
The fact that the Lisbon Agreement's "absolutist"' 9 ' approach
protects those terms "recognized and protected as such in the country

of origin" compensates for this defect, however.19 2 Likewise, the
Madrid Agreement mentions nothing about a nexus between goods

and their source, but instead prohibits the use of false indications of
origin outright. 193 The French Law on the Protection of Appellations
of Origin of May 6, 1919 also lacked substantive standards, but
compensated by calling upon individual judges to fashion their own
tests.194 TRIPs has no commensurate mechanism.195
and characteristics of the corresponding good is unclear, "leaves the parameters
undefined," and needs clarification); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 32 (noting
that TRIPs provides no test by which to determine whether the qualities of a good
are attributable to its origin, and that no positive measures prevent parties from
arguing that a good does not exhibit the necessary relationship to its source).
189. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 118 (indicating that TRIPs Article 22
"derived from the Lisbon Agreement"); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 31-32
(noting that TRIPs Article 22(1) adopts a definition of geographical indicators that
originally appeared in Article 2 of the Lisbon Agreement).
190. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that while "[a] link is
required between the characteristics of the product and the place of origin" under
TRIPs Article 22(1), the Agreement itself provides no substantive test for
establishing attribution); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 32 (pointing out that the
Lisbon Agreement offers no test by which to determine whether the qualities or
characteristics of a good are "'essentially attributable' to their place of origin).
191. See Simon, supra note 135, at 147 n.82 (describing the Lisbon Agreement's
protection of geographical indicators as absolute in nature).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 126, 174 (illustrating that the Lisbon
Agreement requires each Member state to protect geographic indicators "as such in
the country of origin" under Article 1(2)).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 119, 165 (demonstrating that
Article I(1) of the Madrid Agreement prohibits all false or deceptive indicators, not
just those that are likely to mislead the consumer).
194. See also Conrad, supra note 3, at 32 (explaining that the French law
"required judges to develop a standard of their own" in the absence of substantive
standards indicating what sort of nexus must exist between a good's unique
qualities and characteristics and its source in order for protections to apply).
195. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22-24 (lacking any additional provisions that
would inform the "essentially attributable" test contemplated in Article 22(1)); see
also supra text accompanying note 188 (commenting on TRIPs' failure to present
a standard whereby to determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the
characteristics of a good and its origin in order for it to qualify under TRIPs Article
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D. TRIPs ARTICLES 22(2)(a) AND 22(3) VERSUS 23(1):
DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a) and 22(3) allow the false or inaccurate use
of geographical indicators, provided that such use does not actually
196
mislead the public as to the origin of the good bearing that name.
These articles self-consciously focus on the consumer, making the
subjective awareness or knowledge of people in the marketplace the
determinative inquiry. 197 Article 23, by contrast, provides
"Additional Protection for Geographical Indications for Wines and
Spirits."' 98 Unlike Articles 22(2)(a) and 22(3), Article 23(1) does not
require a Member state to show that the use of a geographical
indicator for a wine or spirit could mislead consumers.' 99 Article
23(1) forbids the use of any geographic indicator for a wine or spirit
not actually emanating from the place that the indicator names, even
if language such as "kind," "type, "style," "imitation, or the like"
accompanies the indicator in order to demonstrate that the good
comes from elsewhere, or if the packaging discloses the true origin
of the good.20 0
22(1)).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 42 (pointing out that TRIPs Articles
22(2)(a) and 22(3) require Members to shape their laws so as to allow parties to
prevent the use of or the registration as trademarks of false or inaccurate
geographic indicators that are "of such a nature as to mislead the public as to the
true place of origin").
197. See Farley, supra note 3, at 78 (arguing that TRIPs Article 23, in contrast to
Article 22, makes "a consumer's reaction" to the false or inaccurate geographic
indicator completely immaterial).
198. TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46 (requiring that Members bar
registration as trademarks and prevent the use of any geographic designation
denoting a wine or spirit wine that does not actually come from the place indicated,
even if that designation also reveals the true origin of the goods, if the
geographical indication appears in translation, or if it accompanies language that
clearly indicates it is not actually from a traditional producing region); see also
Bowers, supra note 19, at 146 (explaining that, in contrast to TRIPs art. 22, art. 23
provides additional protections under which "there is no requirement to show that
the public may be mislead by using a particular geographic indication"); Farley,
supra note 3, at 78 (stating that this measure "does not require that the use of the
geographical indication be misleading in order to be actionable").
200. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 199 (noting that TRIPs Article
23(1) affords protection to any false or inaccurate use of a geographic indicator,
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In this sense, the manner in which TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a) and
22(3) relate to TRIPs Article 23(1) mirrors the relationship between
comparable portions of the Paris Convention and Madrid
Agreement. 2°' TRIPs Article 22(2)(a) and 22(3), like Article l0bis of
the Paris Convention, allow the false or inaccurate but nonmisleading use of geographic indicators, 0 2 while TRIPs Article 23(1)
-like Madrid Article I(l)-prohibits (in the case of wines) "[a]ll
goods bearing a false or deceptive indication. ' 20 3 The effort to sever
multilateral protection from the influence of consumer perceptions
that began with Article I(1) of the Madrid Agreement culminated in
Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement, which prohibits "any usurpation
or imitation" 204 of geographical indicators, even if producers make
clear to the consumer that the product does not originate from the
traditional source.205 Thereby, TRIPs Article 23(1) borrows this
standard almost verbatim from Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement,0 6

even if language revealing the good's true place of origin or demonstrating that the
good is from elsewhere accompanies the indicator).
201. See discussion supra Part II.C paras. 2-3 (comparing the substantive
provisions of the Paris Convention and Madrid Agreement and noting that the
Madrid Agreement prohibits all false or misleading indicators while the Paris
Convention prohibits only the fraudulent misapplication of indicators).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 42, 196 (illustrating that TRIPs
Articles 22(2)(a) and 22(3) require Members to grant States parties a legal remedy
to bar the use of or the registration as trademarks of geographic indicators that are
simultaneously false or inaccurate and misleading).
203. TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(1).
204. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 24, art. 3.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 177, 179 (explaining that the
Lisbon Agreement compelled its Members to prohibit the use of any false or
inaccurate geographic indicator, even if the good's actual source is apparent from
the packaging or if the indicator appears in conjunction with language that shows
the good came from somewhere other than the traditional source).
206. Compare Lisbon Agreement, supra note 24, art. 3 (requiring that
"[p]rotection shall be ensured against any usurpation or imitation, even if the true
origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in translated form or
accompanied by terms such as 'kind,' 'type,' 'make,' 'imitation,' or the like"),
with TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(1) (prohibiting the false or inaccurate use of a
geographic indicator "even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such
as 'kind,' 'type,' 'style,' 'imitation,' or the like").
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while Article 22(2)(a) and 22(3) retain the Paris Convention's
weaker "misleading" standard." 7
Consequently, regionally distinct goods that satisfy TRIPs'
substantive requirements, but which do not fall within the ambit of

the special "Additional Protections" 208 that wine and spirits enjoy,
receive only diminished protection.0 9 Moreover, by applying the
"misleading" test under Articles 22(2)(a) and 22(3), while insisting
on an "absolutist" standard in the case of wines and spirits under

Article 23(1), the agreement shows a weakness in those areas where
other multilateral treaties failed for weakness, but shows strength in
those areas in which past agreements were too robust to attract broad
membership.21 0
Cumulatively, then, Articles 22 and 23 prohibit "free-riding" in

the case of wines and spirits, but permit it in the case of all other
goods. Moreover, Article 22's "misleading" test imposes burdens
of production and proof that Article 23 does not. 21 2 The moving party

207. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 118, 166 (noting the Paris
Convention's "liable to mislead" standard).
208. TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23.
209. See Brody, supra note 36, at 522 ("TRIPs does not outlaw registration of
false geographical indications per se, but only those that will "mislead." Under
U.S. law, as under TRIPs, one can register a false geographic designation as a
trademark if it is "arbitrary." An arbitrary mark is one that does not lead to a false
"goods-place" association on the part of the public, or in other words, does not
mislead the public into believing that the goods originate in the place named."); see
also Bowers, supra note 19, at 144-146 (referring to several Member states'
complaints to the WTO regarding the substantive distinctions between TRIPs
Articles 22 and 23 in order to illustrate the practical effects of this disparate
treatment).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 115-118, 161-162 (pointing out
the Paris Convention's substantive weakness); see also supra text accompanying
note 191 (referring to the Lisbon Agreement's "absolutist" substantive standards).
211. See Bowers, supra note 19, at 150 (arguing that, under TRIPS Article 22,
parties from outside a traditional producing region may use a geographic indicator
for their product provided it is not a wine or spirit and so long as it accompanies
one of the very devices Article 23 prohibits). Producers from outside the
Darjeeling region may call their product "Darjeeling-style tea" under TRIPs
Article 22, while a distiller from outside the state of Tennessee may not call his or
her product "Tennessee whiskey" under Article 23. Id. at 132.
212. See id. at 146 (contending that, unlike producers of goods that fall under
TRIPs Article 22, producers holding a qualified geographic indicator for a wine or
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in an Article 22 claim will presumably incur litigation expenses in
excess of those that a party going forward with an Article 23 claim
2 13
would encounter.

The "misleading" test may also be difficult to satisfy in national

courts.21 4 Because foreign courts will inevitably apply differing
standards in the process of determining whether a false or inaccurate
geographic indicator could mislead the consumer, legal uncertainty
will result.2" 5 The "absolutist" character of Article 23's provisions
imposes no such burdens on producers of wines and spirits and
creates no similar risk of legal uncertainty.1 6 TRIPs thus creates two
tiers of protection with marked disparities of protectiveness, which

spirit do not have the onus of proving a violation of the "misleading" test under
TRIPs Article 23). By contrast, any false or inaccurate use of a wine or spirit
indicator is"totally prohibited." Id.
213. See id. at 151 (noting that the "misleading" test is "complicated and
expensive" whereas Article 23 places no commensurate burden on producers in the
case of geographical indicators for wines and spirits).
214. See Brody, supra note 36, at 524-27 (maintaining that there is "room for
debate" as to how even the United States' "misleading" standard, which is fairly
clear law due to the ATF and USTO jurisprudence, relates to TRIPs Article
22(2)(a) and 22(3), and referring to five cases in which U.S. federal courts have
struggled with the "misleading" test). "These cases tend to turn on whether the
public makes an association between the product and the designated geographical
area, and the likelihood of consumers' [sic] mistakenly inferring that association
from defendant's mark.' Id. at 527; see also Bowers, supra note 19, at 151
(arguing that judicial determinations as to whether or not a false or inaccurate
geographic indicator could mislead consumers, as well as the manner in which
"administrative authorities apply and interpret this discretionary element of
'misleading the public,"' differ from one country to the next).
215. See Bowers, supra note 19, at 150-51 (forecasting that, because TRIPs
Article 22's absence of a substantive "misleading test" will leave the national
courts of Member states to determine whether the false or inaccurate use of
geographic indicators create consumer misconceptions as to the true place of
origin, jurisprudence in this area will become a mess of "inconsistent decisions and
legal uncertainty regarding the protection granted to geographical indications
and... enforcement at the international level").
216. See WTO Secretariat, Proposalfrom Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic,
Egypt, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela,
IP/C/W/247/Rev.1 at 2 (May 17, 2001) (complaining of the potential for legal
uncertainty that the disparity of standards in TRIPs Articles 22 and 23 may create,
available at http://www.origin-gi.com/article.php?sid=47 (last visited March 20,
2004).
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exhibits a systemic bias that favors wine and spirit producers over
other similarly situated products.21 7
E.INCONSISTENCIES IN THE EXCEPTIONSAVAILABLE UNDER
TRIPS ARTICLE 24 AND IN THE CALL FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS
UNDER TRIPS ARTICLES 23(4) AND 24(1)

One of the most contentious areas of -the current controversy
involves the diminution of distinctive geographic indicators into nondistinctive or commonplace usage, or simply "degeneration. 2 8
"When [a] geographical name is so widely used that the public
comes to understand it as the name for a category of all the products
of the same type but not necessarily of a certain origin," Albrecht
Conrad explains, "the name is not and. cannot be protected anymore
as a geographic

indication. ' 219 "Cheddar cheese"

and "Dijon

mustard" serve as examples of this misuse of the geographical name
of one product to describe an entire category of products.2
TRIPs Article 24(3) prohibits Members from allowing the level of
protection available under their national laws from diminishing. 2
This requirement imparts a leveling effect 'on the indirect antidegeneration provisions of TRIPs 22(2)(a) and 22(3), on the one

217. See WTO Secretariat, Communicationfrom Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Egypt, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka,
Switzerland, and Turkey, IP/C/W/204/Rev.1 at 3 .(Oct. 2, 2000) (arguing that
"[t]here is no systematic or logical explanation for the distinction made in... the
TRIPs Agreement. This distinction ignores that. geographical indications for
categories of goods other than wines and spirits are equally important for trade"),
available at http://www.ige.ch/E/jurinfo/pdf.ip-(c-w-204.revl-e.pdf (last visited
March 20, 2004).
218. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that although the E.C. countries
learned a lesson about "the difficulties of an agreement that includes the obligation
of the [M]embers to substantially alter their laws" from the failure of the Lisbon
Agreement, the anti-degeneration measures in TRIPs Articles 23 and 24 are a
"trouble spot").
219. Id. at 12.
220. See Bowers, supra note 19, at 147 (providing these two exemplars in order
to explain that TRIPs Article 24 does not purport to protect "terms with geographic
origins that have become well known globally").
221. See supra text accompanying note 51 (relating that TRIPs Article 24(3)
requires Members to maintain a certain level of. protection and that Members
cannot avoid negotiations through Article 24 exceptions).
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hand, and 23(1) on the other, and averts another source of systemic
bias favoring wine and sprit producers.22 2 However, to the extent that
Article 23(1) aims indirectly to prevent the dilution or degeneration

of wine and spirit indicators by proscribing their non-misleading
use, 223 TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a) and 22(3) expose all other geographic
indicators (meaning non-wine or spirit indicators) to more rapid
224
degeneration by allowing such use.
Moreover, TRIPs Article 24(6) places those geographic
indications that have already degenerated to the status of generics in
a particular Member country outside the protective regime of TRIPs
Articles 22 and 23.225 This commonsensical measure allows Member
countries to appropriate freely terms that were already generic in one
Member country at the time of negotiations. 2 6 As one commentator
observes, "TRIPs did not intend to reverse past developments in the
field of geographical indications, such as the case where continuous
227
use has occurred."
222. See supra Part IL.E (illustrating the latent bias that exists in the lack of
substantive standards in TRIPs Article 22(1), in the differing tests that apply to
"nonconforming" or false or inaccurate geographic indicators under TRIPs Articles
22(2)(a), 22(3), and 23(1), in Article 24's exceptions, and in Articles 23(4) and
24(l)'s call for subsequent negotiations).
223. See Conrad, supra note .3,, at 39 (arguing that Article 23(1) makes it
impossible for parties to argue that the inaccurate use of a geographical indicator is
permissible as long as it is not deceptive or misleading, which thereby precludes
one use of geographical indicators that could lead to the dilution of consumers'
association of a good with its place of origin).
224. See Maher,. supra note 21, at 1910 (explaining that the existence of
competing goods on the market that display the names of well-known producing
regions "dilutes the value of famous place names," even when such use, though
false or inaccurate, does not mislead the consumer). Unlimited production of goods
with "nonconforming" geographic indicators (by which Maher means false or
inaccurate but not misleading to consumers, and which Article 22 permits) will
advance "the potential dilutive effect of these nonconforming uses on the goodwill,
renowned, and distinctive qualities associated with appellations of origin." Id.
225. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 24(6) (providing an exception for terms that
have become "customary in common language as the common name").
226. See Bowers, supra note"19, at 147 (maintaining that terms which were
"already generic" in a Member country "remain unprotected under the TRIPs
Agreement"); see also Conrad, supra note '3, at 42 (calling the exception the
equivalent of an acknowledgment that TRIPs "does not and cannot reverse past
developments in the field").
227. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 121; see also Dawson, supra note 137, at 604
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TRIPs Article 24(3), however, proscribes any subsequent
degeneration outright.228 Where TRIPs Article 24(6) is designed to be
responsive to consumer perceptions, 229 Article 24(3) explicitly
freezes protection at the level available in a Member state prior to the
Marrakesh Agreement. 230 This approximates the characteristically
pro-producer anti-degeneration provisions that appear in Article 6 of
the Lisbon Agreement2 1 and Article 1(4) of the Madrid
Agreement.232 TRIPs Article 24(3) thus acts to divorce
determinations of genericism from consumer perception, again
evincing a disregard for its jurisprudential influence.233 More
significantly, the fact that near-identical provisions discouraged
many countries from joining either the Madrid Agreement or the
Lisbon Agreement does not bode well for the future of TRIPs.2 34
(arguing that "a strict application of ... consumer protection and unfair
competition militates against the artificial re-creation of the reputation of
geographical indications for the purpose of reversing genericness").
228. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 221 (explaining that TRIPs Article
24(3) prohibits countries from diminishing whatever protections geographical
indicators received at the time of signing the Marrakesh Agreement).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 225 (noting TRIPs Article 24(6)'s
deference to consumer perceptions).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 221 (illustrating that TRIPs Article
24(3) prohibits Members from decreasing the level of protection they provided at
the time the agreement became binding); see also Chen, supra note 57 at 40-41
(maintaining that, by this model, genericism is contingent upon "'the existing
situation within the Member-State,"' and noting that the Madrid Agreement
establishes that courts of Member countries should decide whether a wine
appellation has degenerated "by reference to the laws of the state from which the
wine originates").
231. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 175, 180 (illustrating that Article 6
of the Lisbon Agreement sets up a rule whereby geographical indicators that
remain protected in their country of origin cannot degenerate into genericism).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 118, 166, 168 (relating that Article
1(4) of the Madrid Agreement leaves it to national courts to decide which
appellations have degenerated to the status of generics, except in the case of wine
appellations, which may never degenerate).
233. See supra text accompanying note 181 (discussing the "diversity" of
normative approaches that characterizes intellectual property regimes as they apply
to geographic indicators).
234. See supra text accompanying note 167 (maintaining that few countries
signed the Madrid Agreement because Article 1(4) is too strong, and because the
status of an indicator turns not on consumer perceptions, but on the compelled
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The "grandfathering 235 available under TRIPs Article 24(4)
presents another example of systemic bias that favors older,
established producers over relative newcomers in that it allows
producers who have used false indicators since April 15, 1984 or
earlier to continue using them.236 Additionally, the "good faith"
exception available under Articles 24(4)(b) and 24(5)237 seems to be
in bad faith. For instance, while it is unlikely that a newer producer
could plausibly argue that he or she did not subjectively know that
"Champagne" refers to a traditional producing region, the same is

not true of older producers in the case of newer appellations.238
Additionally, proposals for further negotiations concerning TRIPs
Article 23(4) and 24(1) exhibit the same biases and result in the same
inequalities as those provisions described above. 239 TRIPs Article
23(4) compels Members to take up negotiations aimed at establishing
a protective registry exclusively for wines. 240 TRIPs Article 24(1)
reciprocal acknowledgement of other Member states' continued protection); see
also Dawson, supra note 137, at 591-592 (contending that "[t]he fact that
appellations of origin registered under the Lisbon Agreement can never become
generic while they are protected in their state of origin is anathema to the laws in
those countries which provide a lesser degree of protection, which they contend
more accurately reflects actual consumer perceptions").
235. See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing the exceptions to the
provisions of Articles 22 and 23 that place Member states whose producers have
used a false or inaccurate geographical indicator for at least ten years prior to April
15, 1994 outside the ambit of TRIPs Articles 22 and 23).
236. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 330 (venturing that the exception available
under TRIPs Article 24(4) confers an "anti-competitive" advantage on older
producers).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (noting that TRIPs Article 24(b)
contemplates an exception to the provisions of Articles 22 and 23 for Member
states in which producers have used a false or inaccurate geographical indicator "in
good faith" preceding the "grandfathering" period, and explaining the exception
under TRIPs Article 24(5) for trademarks obtained "in good faith").
238. See Lindquist, supra note 20, at 330 (stating that no vintner could credibly
maintain that he failed to realize that Burgundy, France was a traditional producer
famed for its reds, and concluding that "the good faith exception is easily
eliminated").
239. See supra Parts II.D, II.E (demonstrating a systemic bias in the absence of
substantive standards in TRIPs Article 22(1), in the disparity of substantive
standards in TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a), 22(3) and Article 23(1), and in the exceptions
available under TRIPs Article 24).
240. See TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 23(4) (compelling Members to take up further
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also requires the Members to negotiate greater protections for wines
and spirits only, and prohibits the Members from using any of the
Article 24 exceptions to refuse to engage in subsequent
negotiations. 4' One can imagine the Vidalia onion grower's dismay
at the fact that Articles 23(4) and 24(1) require talks directed at
securing greater protection solely for wines and spirits, nakedly
discriminating among producers and baldly promoting the interests
of Europeans over others who produce equally distinct goods.24 2

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
TRIPs Articles 22-24 go beyond the international community's
capacity for consensus 243 and exhibit untenable systemic biases that
work in favor of wine and spirit producers and to the disadvantage of
equally-qualified producers of other goods. 44 The WTO should
dismantle TRIPs Articles 22-24 as they exist, and substitute a system
of international registration that accounts for the interests of both
producer and consumer.245 Indeed, such a fresh start was not beyond
negotiations "to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines").
241. See id. art. 24(1) (stating that "Members agree to enter into negotiations
aimed at increasing the protection of individual indications under Article 23" and
establishing that "[tihe provisions of paragraph 4 through 8 below shall not be
used.., to refuse to conduct negotiations").
242. See supra text accompanying note 222 (pointing out areas of TRIPs
Articles 22-24 that favor European producers); see also Brody, supra note 36, at
535 (discussing the pressure that the United States' trading partners have exerted in
an effort to augment the protections contemplated in TRIPs Article 23(4) and
24(1)).
243. See supra Parts II.B, II.C (arguing that the scope of the protective regime
TRIPs contemplates overreaches the level of international consensus); see also
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 110 (describing the TRIPs agreement as providing "a
historically unprecedented level of protection for geographical indications");
Conrad, supra note 3, at 29 (calling TRIPs' attempt to go beyond the accepted
forms of protection for geographical indicators in several WTO Member countries
"rather unrealistic").
244. See supra Parts IID, II.E (arguing that omissions, inconsistencies, and
disparities in TRIPs Articles 22-24 result in the potential for confusion, and more
significantly, for the discriminatory treatment of goods that are nevertheless
eligible for protection under TRIPs' standards).
245. See Bowers, supra note 19, at 153 (referring to a communication to the
WTO from the Australian delegation in order to argue that the search for a more
suitable protective regime for geographic indicators "would most productively start
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the drafters' contemplation: the Preamble to TRIPs itself calls for
"new rules and disciplines..,
' 246
national legal systems.

taking into account differences in

One scholar points out that TRIPs' open-ended and indefinite

scope affords "opportunities for each Member to police other
Member's national laws. '247 The preceding analysis demonstrates
that substantively intrusive provisions do not engender broad,

multilateral participation.248 A registry, on the contrary, would
provide positive protection without compelling WTO Members to
fundamentally alter their national laws.249
Both the United States and the European Union submitted
proposals for a registration system under TRIPs Article 23(4).25 o The
Members committed themselves to concluding some sort of
agreement on TRIPs Article 23(4)'s "built-in agenda" by September
2003,25 1 but the WTO has not reported any progress to date. 52 The
with a consideration of the actual forms of protection that are provided in national
law").
246. TRIPs, supra note 1, pmbl.
247. Conrad, supra note 3, at 31.
248. See supra Part II.C (describing the intrusive character of the Lisbon
Agreement, and noting the agreement's failure to attract broad membership).
249. See Grosek, supra note 122, at 476-77 (arguing that "[w]ithin most foreign
countries, trademark rights are dependent upon formal registration"). Grosek goes
on to explain that this system promotes stability and predictability through the use
of a published register of protected terms, an appellate procedure for registration
disputes, and entitlement to representation. Id. at 477.
250. See Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and Registration of
Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs
Agreement, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/133/Rev. 1 (July 26, 1999) [hereinafter United
States Proposal] (cataloging the United States' proposal for a multilateral system
of registration for geographic indicators), available at http:/ docsonline.wto.org/
(last visited Mar. 21, 2004); see also WTO, Annual Report (1999) of the Council
for TRIPs, WTO Doc. IP/C/19 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter E.U. Proposal A]
(detailing part of the E.U. proposal for a "TRIPs plus" registry), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2004); see also Proposal for a
Multilateral System for Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications
for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs Agreement, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/133 (Mar. 11, 1999) [hereinafter E.U. Proposal B] (describing, in part, the
E.U.'s suggestions for a "TRIPs plus" registry and notification system), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).
251. See Burkhart Goebel, GeographicalIndicationsand Trademarks- the Road
From Doha, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 964, 976 (2003) (noting that a system of
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E.U. proposal explains how Members may apply for registration, as

well as provide a mechanism whereby adverse parties may challenge,
registration. 25 3 This procedure allows parties to oppose registration
based only upon the language of TRIPs Article 24(6), itself, by

claiming the process has degenerated into genericism. 2 14 That is, the
only permissible basis for a challenge explicitly refers back to TRIPs
itself.255 The provision is thus circular: the only way to block

registration of an indicator is by demonstrating to the satisfaction of
the TRIPs Council that TRIPs does not entitle the indicator to
2 56
protection at all.

Worse, the E.U. proposal would deny national courts any role in
determining whether a good qualifies for the registry. 7 In contrast,
the U.S. proposal would entrust enforcement to the Member states'

legal regimes,258 but would make the registry little more than a
suggestive compendium of those geographic indicators eligible for
registration. 25 9 Alternately,

the E.U.

proposal

suggests that a

notification and registration "is the most pressing issue" under TRIPs at present,
and referring to TRIPs Article 23(4)'s agenda).
252. See WTO, Information and Media Relations Division, TRIPs News: News
and Press Releases About the TRIPS Council and TRIPs in the WTO (lacking any
new postings regarding the status of the TRIPs Council negotiations scheduled for
December 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t-news-e.htm
(last visited Mar. 21 2004).
253. See E.U. Proposals A and B, supra note 250 (proposing that Members list
geographical indicators that they want protected under TRIPs, and that opposing
countries have. one year from the initial listing in which to contest the application
for protection on the grounds of any portion of TRIPs Articles 22-24).
254. See id. (restricting challenges to a Member's application for protection of a
geographic indicator to the genericism provision Article 24(6) embodies).
255. See supra text accompanying note 254 (limiting remedies available under
the proposed registration system to TRIPs Article 24(6)).
256. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 129-30 (explaining that, "if a [M]ember can
only oppose an application based on reasons stemming from the TRIPs agreement,
then a successful opposition means the geographical indication is not protectible
under TRIPs").
257. See Goebel, supra note 251, at 980 (pointing out that, under the E.U.
proposal, "[t]he well-established systems of the national courts do not come into
play at all").
258. See id. at 978 (explaining that the U.S. proposal would invest national court
systems with the task of enforcing the registry).
259. See id. (referring to various proposals by the United States, Canada, Chile,
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successful challenge to the eligibility of an indicator for registration
should exempt only the opposing party from its TRIPs obligations. 6 °
This would lead to 145 violations per successful challenge by a
single Member of most-favored nation treatment under GATT
Article 4, and would essentially relegate the WTO Members' TRIPs
obligations to a confusing muddle of product-specific bilateral
accords.26 '
Instead, the system should reduce indicators' protected status to a
form that would enable WTO Members to "trade" them, just like any
other benefit under the GATT/WTO.262 A promising analog exists in
exchanges between the United States and France, and between the
United States and the European Union.2 63 In the first transaction, the
United States promised to recognize the French appellations
"Cognac" and "Armagnac," while France agreed to protect

and Japan that recommend a non-binding system under which the WTO would
collect data and provide the Members with notice of the registrability of
geographic indicators).
260. See Proposal For a Multilateral Register of Geographical Indications For
Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs Agreement, at V(3), WTO
Doc. IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998) (recommending that, "[i]f registration is refused
and the refusal is confirmed by the appropriate mechanism within a reasonable
period of time, only a Member who had opposed the granting of protection and
produced evidence to support its opposition need not apply the principle of full and
indefinite protection"), available at http://www.docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited
Mar. 21, 2004). The revised E.U. proposal reiterates the necessity of establishing
the "multilateral register" described in the July 28, 1998 proposal. See
Implementation of Article 23.4 of the TRIPs Agreement Relating to the
Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of
Geographical Indications, WTO Doe. IP/C/W/107/Rev.1 (June 22, 2000)
(describing the E.U. proposal for a multilateral register), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2004)
261. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 130 (suggesting that if only the party that
succeeded in opposing the registration of an indicator were exempted from its
TRIPs obligations, a violation of most-favored nation treatment under GATT
Article 4 would occur).
262. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that a system that successfully
induced countries to exchange fixed lists would still present considerable practical
difficulties).
263. See Mosca, supra note 58, at 596-97 (detailing the terms of two bilateral
exchanges of reciprocal protection for geographic indicators, one between the
United States and France, and another between the United States and the European
Union).
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"Bourbon" and "Bourbon Whisky" from misappropriation.

64

In the

second, the European Union promised to prohibit the inaccurate use
of the terms "Tennessee whiskey/whisky," "Bourbon," and
"Bourbon whisky" and the United States responded by protecting
"Scotch whisky," "Cognac," "Armagnac," and "Calvados. 26 5
Observers note the obvious limitations of this sort of transactional
arrangement, but it does serve to intimate WTO Members' ability to

"trade"

in protected geographic

indicators

when multilateral

agreements do not provide the desired level of protection.26 6
At the very least, as TRIPs promotes wines and spirits over those

goods that are no less valid under the agreement's definition of
geographic indicators, the Members must draft a new agreement in
which subtle substantive disparities do not create systemic biases

favoring one entire category of producers over another. 67 In the
course of determining which indicators are eligible, the registry
should afford equal consideration to the two "mandatory
requirements" that the ECJ has enunciated repeatedly: fair trade and

consumer protection. 268 The screening and approval process for any
such registry of protected geographic indicators should aptly reflect
and balance this dichotomy of interests.269 Members may adduce

264. See id. (referring to the understanding that the United States would prohibit
an American producer from calling its good "California cognac" or "cognac-style
liqueur, made in the U.S.A." in exchange for France's reciprocal assurances
regarding "Bourbon").
265. See id. (listing the terms the United States "traded" with the European
Union).
266. See id. at 596 (calling this exchange "rather limited" because it does not
prevent the continued misappropriation of the French appellations).
267. See discussion supra Parts II.D, I.E (describing portions of the TRIPs
Agreement that comprise substantive deficiencies that result in a trade
disadvantage to an entire class of producers).
268. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
2, 8 (holding that national regulations having the
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649,
effect of a trade restriction are only permissible under the E.C. Treaty to the extent
that they serve the interests of free trade and consumer protection); see also Case
8 (calling
286/86, Ministere Public v. Gerard Deserbais, 1988 E.C.R. 4907,
consumer protection and fair trading "imperative").
269. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the differing normative
approaches to protecting geographic indicators in the European Union and the
United States).
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expert testimony, as well as the results of polls or surveys, in support
of their submission or in an attempt to block another Member from
registering an indicator.270 When a term ceases to denote an
indication of origin, as well as assurances of quality and some nexus
between its qualities and place of origin, it should become
unregistrable.2 7 ' Such a system of registration will more effectively
promote the ends of stability and predictability, which are
fundamental to a rules-based multilateral trade regime.2 72

CONCLUSION
TRIPs Articles 22-24 overreach the existing state of international
intellectual property law by failing to take account of the diversity of
national concepts concerning geographic indicators, 27 3 and
attempting to institute a protective regime which the ECJ has
consistently refused to vindicate 27 4 and that has never enjoyed broad
multilateral protection. 275 The TRIPs Articles 22-24 create
considerable uncertainty in the domain of international trade 27 6 and,
most significantly, disadvantage an entire category of producers
through substantive inconsistency, which is untenable.2 77
270. See Conrad, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that German judges sometimes rely

on surveys in order to determine whether an indicator is "geographically
descriptive" in unfair competition cases).
271. See id. at 12 (arguing that when a geographic indicator becomes so
common in everyday use that the connection between a good and its origin no
longer exists in the mind of consumers, "the name is not and cannot be protected
anymore as a geographic indication").
272. See Grosek, supra note 122, at 476, 478-79 (explaining that international

intellectual property rights regimes promote stability and seek to "eliminate...
processes that are burdensome, expensive, or delaying").
273. See discussion supra Part II.A (describing the failure of TRIPs Articles 2224 to account for the lack of consensus between the United States and European
Union regarding what normative objectives the protection of geographic indicators
as intellectual property should promote).
274. See discussion supra Part II.B (arguing that the ECJ has consistently
refused to uphold the sort of protections that TRIPs Articles 22-24 contemplate).

275. See discussion supra Part II.C (contending that TRIPs Articles 22-24 will
fail for the same reason that past multilateral agreements failed).
276. See discussion supra Part II.C (demonstrating the uncertainty that results

from the absence of substantive standards in TRIPs Article 22(1)).
277. See discussion supra Part II.D (pointing out the inequity that results from
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disparities between the substantive standards of TRIPs Articles 22(2)(a), 22(3), and
23(1)); see also discussion supra Part II.E (illustrating the bias that results from
inconsistencies in the exceptions available under TRIPs Article 24, and in TRIPs
Article 23(4) and 24(l)'s call for further negotiations).

